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1. The governance of urban design 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The Toronto waterfront covers an area of 800 hectares and is one of the largest 
redevelopment ventures of its kind in North America (Waterfront Toronto 2010). 
Efforts to transform the city’s waterfront are currently led by a public agency that is 
the steward of Toronto’s waterfront redevelopment programme and the lead master 
planner of the waterfront. Since 1999 it has pursued a complex urban design, 
planning and real estate agenda and committed to a policy of ‘design excellence’ 
(TWRC 2002). To realise its agenda, the corporation has employed a variety of 
instruments to govern urban design outcomes on Toronto’s waterfront, including: 
design-led masterplanning, peer design review and public participation. 
 
Systematic analyses of urban design processes across a broad sweep of time are 
rarely undertaken and, as Carmona (2014, 4) argues, “few urban design 
interventions are subjected to analysis that compares outcomes with processes of 
delivery”. The purpose of this paper is to do just that: unpack the urban design 
process on Toronto’s waterfront and assess the initial outcomes. The paper 
examines the political context underpinning Toronto’s waterfront redevelopment and 
the evolution of the most recent planning and design agenda; it assesses the tools 
and mechanisms used to deliver new buildings and public spaces; and, it evaluates a 
series of case studies to understand how the urban design process has shaped the 
waterfront’s changing built form and public realm. 
 
1.2 Toronto: a booming city  
 
Toronto is the largest city in Canada. With a population of 2.8 million and a further 
2.7 million people residing in its suburban hinterland, it is the commercial, financial 
and cultural hub of Canada and the gateway for around 30% of new immigrants to 
Canada (City of Toronto 2014). Toronto is famed for its diverse urban 
neighbourhoods and vibrant street life and, according to the widely quoted Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) liveability ranking, it is consistently recognised as one of the 
most liveable cities in the world (EIU 2013). Toronto’s waterfront district sits 
immediately south of the city’s urban core on the shore of Lake Ontario (see Figure 
1). 
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Figure 1: The Greater Toronto Area and the Toronto Waterfront Study Area 
(Map produced by the author using a base map from Google Maps) 
 
 
The city’s position in the EIU liveability ranking has helped precipitate a real estate 
boom which, despite a small decline in late 2008, has seen exponential growth ever 
since (Lehrer et al. 2010). In 2013, as many as 55,000 condominium units were 
under construction in the city (Austen 2013) – a number that well surpasses the rate 
of construction in other North American cities, including New York (Sturgeon 2014). 
Condominium construction has mainly occurred in the city’s downtown and 
surrounding inner city districts and has dramatically changed the image of the city. 
Where low-rise commercial and industrial buildings and parking lots once stood, a 
dense ribbon of glass and steel residential towers ranging from 20 to as many as 70 
stories has arisen. The waterfront is thus at the epicentre of Toronto’s redevelopment 
boom. 
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Figure 2: Condominium development in Toronto’s inner city  
(Photograph by the author, 2013) 
 
This image looks west from the Railway Lands with the Gardiner Expressway in the 
foreground. It illustrates the considerable amount of high-rise, and high density, residential 
development that has occurred in the last fifteen years on the post-industrial lands in-between 
Toronto’s downtown core and the waterfront district. 
 
1.3 A ‘terrain of availability’ on the waterfront 
 
The story of redevelopment on Toronto’s waterfront is not one of sustained ‘design 
excellence’, but rather a long saga fraught by “jurisdictional gridlock” (Eidelman 2011, 
263). Cast as a “terrain of availability” by the urban designer Ken Greenberg (1996, 
195), the waterfront has been characterised by unrealised and quixotic planning and 
design visions since the early 1960s that have often been tarnished by government 
agencies vying for control over development rights. The construction of various 
commercial, residential and cultural buildings as well as numerous public spaces in 
the central portion of the waterfront during the 1970s and 1980s, have broadly failed 
to improve the visual and morphological qualities of the waterfront (see Figure 4) and 
large areas of derelict land, especially in the eastern waterfront and the Port Lands 
(see Figure 3 and 4), remain undeveloped. 
 
Compounded by its sheer size and the complications resulting from a patchwork of 
public and private landownership, the physical environment on the waterfront is 
fragmented. This problem is augmented both by the railway corridor that serves 
Toronto’s Union Station, which cuts a wide east-west cleavage between the 
downtown and the waterfront, and by the elevated Gardiner Expressway, which runs 
parallel to the railway corridor along the entire length of the waterfront (see Figure 4). 
 
 8 
Figure 3: Toronto’s waterfront 
(Diagram by the author) 
 
 
Together, the railway corridor and the expressway create a mental widening of what, 
in reality, is a distance of less than one kilometre between the heart of Toronto’s 
downtown core and the shoreline of Lake Ontario. Despite the fact that the wide 
north-south streets of Toronto’s urban grid terminate on the waterfront, pedestrian 
and vehicles alike have to navigate a maze of tunnels, overpasses and complicated 
road junctions to reach the water’s edge. 
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Figure 4: Toronto’s waterfront 
(Photographs by the author, 2013) 
 
The Central Waterfront, Easy Bayfront and the Port Lands. This view eastwards captures the 
essence of Toronto’s waterfront: a narrow strip of land between the city core and the Inner 
Harbour, intersected by the Gardiner Expressway and a railway corridor. The waterfront 
opens out to the east into the post-industrial East Bayfront and the vast Port Lands beyond. 
 
The Gardiner Expressway and the Railway Corridor. This image looking north on Yonge 
Street illustrates how pedestrian movement between the Central Waterfront and the Financial 
District is inhibited both by the Expressway and by the lengthy underpass beneath the railway 
corridor. 
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1.4. Research context and method 
Now under the purview of the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation (TWRC)1, 
an agency created and funded by the federal, provincial and municipal governments 
in the early 2000s, Toronto’s waterfront does appear to be changing. The allocation 
of significant government resources to the task of redevelopment, combined with the 
corporation’s commitment to a design-led redevelopment vision that champions 
design excellence suggests that a new phase of design-led redevelopment might 
have begun. A key objective of the research is to interrogate this proposition and, in 
so doing, understand the process of urban design governance and delivery on the 
waterfront. 
 
Using a qualitative case study methodology, the research data was collected 
between 2009 and 2013 via archival research, semi-structured interviews and direct 
observations. .Approximately 300 textual and visual sources were assembled and 46 
semi-structured interviews were conducted. The research participants included: City 
of Toronto planners and officials, representatives of the waterfront corporation, 
developers, design professionals, politicians, community activists and the press. 
Further informal conversations were also held with academics and commentators 
interested in Toronto’s waterfront. Quotations from the interview participants are 
used in the paper to support the narrative and the coding system is described in the 
appendix. 
 
1.5 Why is urban design important? 
 
Achieving higher standards of design can add value to both new and existing parts of 
a city or neighbourhood (Carmona et al. 2002). For real estate developers and their 
financiers, the producers of the built environment, urban design can help to stabilise 
local market conditions, reduce overall risk and better the marketing potential of new 
projects (Madanipour 2006). For those who live and work in cities, the users of the 
built environment, urban design has the potential to both improve how a place 
functions and enhance its symbolic value, while, for agencies of government, the 
regulators of the built environment, urban design can be harnessed for competitive 
advantage (ibid.) and employed as a “means of economic development” (Gospodini 
2002, 60). High quality urban design is also recognised as a sophisticated instrument 
for managing environmental change, as well as an issue around which stakeholders 
                                            
1 Since 2007 renamed Waterfront Toronto. 
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can participate in the process of developing and implementing a planning and design 
vision (Madanipour 2006; author 2015). Notably, as concepts of sustainable 
development have ascended urban policy agendas, interest in the social and 
environmental value of urban design has increased. This has generated a growing 
preference for compact and walkable neighbourhoods in which shops and services 
are mixed with residential and employment space and pedestrians and cyclists have 
priority over vehicles – the very principles that urban designers have long argued 
create higher quality built environments (e.g. Jacobs 1961; Gehl 1987). It is also 
increased interest in the ecology in the city and the ways in which sustainable 
infrastructure might be used to enhance the quality of the built environment and, at 
the same time, improve conditions for local wildlife (Beatley 2004; Hester 2008; 
Newman and Jennings 2008). 
 
Yet the value of urban design can be a double-edged sword. The constant pressure 
upon the regulators of the built environment to generate new avenues of investment 
and create jobs has forced them to find ways to use urban design as a marketing tool 
to enhance global competitiveness (Gospodini 2002; Julier 2005) and “lend traction 
to capital accumulation” (Knox 2010, 5). Numerous governing authorities have been 
criticised for using large commercial endeavours and other ‘spectacle’ projects to 
generate income without properly addressing the social divisions, gentrification and 
proliferation of privately managed public space that often results (Loukaitou-Sideris 
and Banerjee 1998; Harvey 2000). In a case study of Melbourne’s waterfront, Kim 
Dovey (2005) demonstrated how public-spirited urban design practices were 
overshadowed by powerful public-private partnerships and fantastical architectural 
imagery. Reaching similar conclusions, but focused on an altogether different context, 
Moore-Milroy’s 2009 book, Thinking Planning and Urbanism, uses a case study to 
explore the complex story of Dundas Square in downtown Toronto where she 
unravels a planning and design process dominated by influential corporate interests 
in which the new public space that emerged at the heart of the city’s downtown was 
the first in Toronto that could be used to house commercial gated events. 
 
In an analysis of urban design governance in Sydney, John Punter (2005) argues 
that the creation of better public spaces and achieving higher standards of urban 
design quality is undoubtedly at the core of that city’s economic competitiveness 
agenda. He notes that, like in many other Western cities, there has been a 
“preoccupation with iconic buildings, with the city image and skyline, with the city as 
spectacle in terms of architectural set pieces…” (144). Yet, he also counters that the 
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city’s commitment to urban design goes beyond fetishism. A parallel City Spaces 
Program has successfully democratised space in the central city. More public open 
spaces have been made available, pedestrian-only movement space has been 
increased and the city provides a wide range of amenities for local residents, 
including swimming pools, leisure facilities and cultural venues. Reaching similar 
conclusions in a 2011 study of urban design and regeneration in Liverpool, Mike 
Biddulph notes that Liverpool’s urban design agenda, which emerged as a key 
component of urban policymaking during the New Labour years, was “driven by a 
concern for prosperity” (2011, 100). Yet Biddulph cautions that it would be simplistic 
to assume that urban design was merely a tool in a wider global competitiveness 
agenda. He argues that while the objective of attracting investment often aligns with 
improvements in the design of the public realm, the two are not always dependent. 
Biddulph concludes that “the ‘[p]eople working to secure urban design qualities…” in 
Liverpool “…have done so in the understanding that such work is in the general 
public interest” (2011, 101). 
 
For many planners, the planning and design achievements of Vancouver, Canada is 
often cited as an example of how thoroughgoing design policymaking and judicious 
design negotiation on the part of city officials can result in a major city centre 
residential development boom while, at the same time, the retention and 
enhancement of public amenities, such as open spaces, schools and community 
centres (Punter 2003; MacDonald 2005). However, even in Vancouver, despite good 
intentions the success of the city’s design revolution has led to negative ‘knock on’ 
effects, including unaffordable house prices and, as the opportunities for 
development creep further from the central city and to more disadvantages 
neighbourhoods, various challenges associated with gentrification and social 
polarisation (Smith 2003). 
 
1.6 Research themes and guiding questions 
 
The research themes and guiding questions for this study are directly informed by 
the literature on Anglo-American urban design governance and process. This 
research tradition began during the 1970s following the publication of Jonathan 
Barnett’s text, Urban Design as Public Policy (1974). Barnett used his experience as 
the head of urban design in the New York City planning department to demonstrate 
that private sector design could be controlled more effectively through a combination 
of comprehensive urban design policies and regulatory mechanisms. In exchange for 
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greater floor area allowances, and other ‘bonuses’, for example, Barnett’s urban 
design team required developers to approach building projects within the context of a 
wider urban design plan. The approach adopted in New York highlighted how strong 
policy directives and supporting regulation might be used to powerful effect. Yet, at 
the same time, Barnett’s work also demonstrated the importance of give and take 
between the public and private sectors. As Hack and Sagalyn (2011) reflect “urban 
design is often portrayed as shaping cities through bold visions of the future. In truth, 
it is largely devoted to the practical task of acquiring public or collective goods 
through the process of city building” (258). 
 
Barnett’s ground-breaking practice precipitated considerable interest among urban 
policymakers in North American and European cities about how to impact the design 
of the built environment through the planning process and embed a design ethos into 
decision-making. Ever since, a growing field of scholarly research has sought to 
evaluate the mechanisms used to integrate more design-aware decision-making into 
existing planning and development processes (e.g. Lai 1988; Scheer and Preiser 
1994; Punter 1999; 2003; 2005; 2007; Punter and Carmona 1997; author 2015). This 
work has shown that, in Canadian and American cities, where zoning prevails, city 
governments have tended to enhance design quality by introducing discretionary 
tools such as peer design review and written design guidance into planning approval 
processes (Lai 1989; Scheer and Preiser 1994; Nasar and Grannis 1999; Kumar and 
George 2002; Punter 2003). In contrast, planners and urban designers in the UK, 
where planning decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, have experimented 
with control mechanisms, such as masterplanning and design codes, to govern the 
quality of the built environment (Hall 1996; Punter and Carmona 1997; Carmona 
2009). The governance of urban design, both in North America and in the UK, has 
also been reshaped by increasingly sophisticated approaches to public consultation 
that encourage local people and other stakeholders to engage directly in the design 
process and make decisions collaboratively with expert designers (author 2015). 
 
Punter (2007) notes that the growing focus on design quality in many planning 
jurisdictions has blurred the “distinction between…regulatory and discretionary 
systems” (168). He argues that a convergence of design control and management 
practice has taken place as governing authorities have adopted various measures to 
suit local political contexts, development cultures and bureaucratic procedures. 
Large-scale redevelopment sites, such as waterfronts, arguably provide an 
instructive lens to understand the evolution and implementation of design 
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governance and, in particular, the convergence and adaptation of design tools and 
mechanism such as design guidance, masterplanning, peer design review and public 
engagement. However, it is important to understand the effectiveness of these tools 
and mechanisms and, in particular, the impact they have on design outcomes. The 
effectiveness of an individual tool or mechanism is influenced by a range of factors, 
not only related to the quality of the governance instrument itself, but also by external 
factors such as local politics, financing and the wider regulatory regime. Moreover, 
these impacts might shift with time as the context for design governance changes 
(Carmona 2014). Masterplanning, for example, is often credited for providing a long-
term design-led vision for an area that improves financial certainty for investors (Bell 
2005; Tiesdell and MacFarlane 2007), yet at the same time, many masterplans lack 
regulatory clout and end up doing little to shape development outcomes. Similarly, 
peer design review processes have been credited for raising the quality of the debate 
about design outcomes and encouraging designers and developers to submit higher 
quality project for review (Punter 2003a), but have also faced criticism for limiting 
architectural freedom (Costonis 1989; Mandelker 1993; Scheer 1994). 
 
The tools and mechanisms associated with the governance of urban design are 
inevitably interventionist because they are deployed by planners to steer real estate 
towards “policy-shaped rather than merely market-led outcomes” (Tiesdell and 
Adams 2011, 3). Urban design governance and policymaking is thus a ‘second-order’ 
design activity (George 1997) that “….shapes the design and development process 
by creating a frame for acts of first-order design,” (Tiesdell and Adams, 2011, 2). As 
a result, urban design is often a highly contentious component of the planning 
decision-making process and a site of “seemingly endless conflict” (Punter and 
Carmona 1997, 1) between the regulators, producers and users of the built 
environment. Urban design is not only a process of negotiation between the private 
sector developers who propose projects and the public sector planners who assess 
applications for development, it also causes professional conflicts between architects 
and urban planners and disagreements between professionals and the general 
public about the nature of what constitutes ‘good design’. Furthermore, because 
urban design is frequently a core concern on larger scale development projects, it 
often leads to emotive political debates that engage local elected officials, community 
groups and businesses (Punter and Carmona 1997). 
 
Strengthening the urban design dimension of a city’s planning system, whether 
through a focused urban redevelopment effort, such as a waterfront, or via more 
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citywide changes to planning decision-making, is therefore challenging and complex. 
Invariably weak institutional arrangements and political and financial instability 
dominate; plans get delayed or derailed, causing significant urban design shortcuts 
to be taken (e.g. Sandercock and Dovey 2002; Punter 2007a; Bezmez 2008) and, 
even when urban design is given preference in the planning decision-making process, 
it does not necessarily lead to better quality design at the later stages of 
implementation. As Punter and Carmona (1997) argue, “overall design quality can be 
and often is sacrificed to achieve other objectives, particularly the desire for any 
development or job creation in less economically advantaged areas” (1). Ultimately, 
power in the urban design decision-making process tends to rest with those who 
assume the greatest financial risk (Carmona 2014).  
 
The guiding concern of this research therefore rests in understanding who makes 
decisions about design, how are these decision are made, what policy mechanisms 
and regulatory tools are used and to what extent the urban design process actually 
shapes the physical built environment. Drawing directly from a series of best practice 
principles for design review and management developed by Punter (2007, 171), and 
latterly amended by this author (author 2015, 344), the following questions are 
posed: Is there a clear vision, developed collaboratively with the community, that 
underpins the pursuit of design excellence, and how is expressed? Is the widest 
possible range of actors and instruments harnessed to the goal of design excellence, 
are zoning and planning controls co-ordinated effectively, and are the exclusionary 
effects of design regulation addressed? Is design reviewed against broad substantive 
design principles that embrace issues of amenity, accessibility, community, vitality 
and ecology, and is scope left for individual creativity and innovation? And, are the 
processes of review transparent, constructively skilled, do the actors in the design 
control process have the capacity to react to changing market conditions and is 
administrative discretion management appropriately? 
 
1.7 Paper structure  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly summaries the 
existing literature on Toronto’s waterfront and looks, in particular, at the period 
between 1970 and 1999 when the post-industrial future of the waterfront lands first 
entered the political and public consciousness. Sections 3 to 5 then explore the 
establishment of a governance regime and the formation of a planning and design 
vision for the waterfront in the period since 1999. Section 3 details the two year 
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period between 1999 and 2000 when the federal, provincial and municipal 
governments placed responsibility for the waterfront’s future in the hands of a private 
sector-led Task Force and charged it with developing a design-led vision and 
management strategy for the waterfront. Section 4 describes the period between late 
2000 and 2002 when a tri-government agreement was reached to fund the waterfront 
redevelopment project and the TWRC was formally established to govern the design 
and planning process. Section 5 documents the financial and governance challenges 
that beset the waterfront corporation between 2002 and 2006 and explores how the 
involvement of the city’s mayor and a comprehensive review of the corporation’s 
management structure impacted the effectiveness of the new corporation to act as 
‘lead masterplanner’ of the waterfront. Section 6 then turns away from the 
chronological timeline and identifies the tools and mechanisms established alongside 
the statutory planning framework to govern for design excellence. The effectiveness 
of these tools and mechanisms and their impact on design outcomes is then 
evaluated in the remaining sections of the paper. Section 7 explores the role of 
precinct masterplanning as a guiding mechanism for development. Section 8 
evaluates an urban design peer review panel that was established by the TWRC to 
assess design proposals. And, Section 9 analysis the role of public participation and 
engagement in shaping design decisions on the waterfront. In each of these last 
three sections particular focus is placed on the delivery of new buildings and public 
spaces in the East Bayfront, one of the key development areas on the waterfront 
(see Figure 2). Finally, an assessment design governance on Toronto’s waterfront 
and a series of reflections on the future of the waterfront redevelopment programme 
are presented in Section 10. 
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 2. A brief history of Toronto’s waterfront, 1912-1999 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Toronto’s waterfront redevelopment has attracted considerable scholarly attention 
over the years. One of the principal chroniclers of this history has been Gene Desfor, 
a York University (Canada) scholar who has focused on the impacts of large-scale 
environmental engineering projects and the contestations that have periodically 
arisen over land ownership (Desfor 1988; Desfor 1993; Desfor et al. 1988; Desfor et 
al. 1989). Desfor’s most recent contribution to the literature was a 2011 edited book 
titled Reshaping Toronto’s Waterfront, co-edited with Jennefer Laidley. It contains 
some thirteen chapters by various local authors and examines the legacy of 
unfulfilled plans, missed opportunities and environment controls that have defined 
the last 100 hundred years of growth, decline and rebirth on the waterfront. This 
section draws on these contributions, and others, to briefly chronicle and 
contextualises the history of planning and design governance on Toronto’s waterfront 
from the early 20th century until the end of the 1990s. 
 
2.2 Creating a waterfront port 
 
A federal agency called the Toronto Harbour Commissioners (THC) managed 
Toronto’s waterfront for most of the 20th Century (Desfor et al. 2011). Desfor (1993) 
describes the THC as a ‘hybrid corporation’ with typical port agency functions, such 
as control over major infrastructure projects and landfilling, in conjunction with 
functions commonly undertaken by a private corporation, like the promotion, 
development and management of industrial uses on the waterfront. As a result, the 
THC acted more like a development agency than a port authority for much of the 20th 
century (Merrens 1988) and, soon after it was established, began an aggressive 
landfill programme that ultimately resulted in the creation of approximately 1,300 
acres of new waterfront land (Desfor 1993). The landfilling programme was guided 
by the corporation’s 1912 Waterfront Plan (Toronto Harbour Commissioners 1913), 
which envisioned the transformation of the lakeshore marshes at Ashbridge’s Bay 
(see Figure 1 for location) into a major industrial harbour (see Figure 6). Beginning in 
the 1880s, a huge swathe of land was created on the Eastern waterfront and, in the 
1920s, the natural path of the Don River was replaced with the Keating Chanel 
shipping canal and concrete slip heads were added at the termini of the city’s north-
south streets for docking purposes. In 1939, the Toronto Island Airport was also 
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opened by the THC on the Western edge of the waterfront (Desfor 1993; Desfor et al. 
2011).  
 
Figure 5: Landfill activity on Toronto’s waterfront 
(City of Toronto 1982, 14) 
 
This illustration demonstrates the landfilling activity that was conduced by the THC during the 
20th century. Most notable is the creation of extensive new lands on the eastern waterfront, 
located to the south Keating Chanel – the engineered canal at the mouth of the Don River 
that was constructed during the 1950s. Much of the land south of Keating Channel was never 
fully developed and remained vacant of underutilised. 
 
The THC focused on attracting industry to the new waterfront lands and creating a 
stable industrial property market. Yet, in spite of these efforts, the waterfront never 
really boomed as an industrial district. By 1929, the THC had leased only 29% of the 
450 acres of new land it had created for heavy and medium industrial uses on the 
waterfront (Desfor 1993). Moreover, although its port function saw a modest increase 
in trade after the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959, the amount of annual 
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tonnage began to decline after the 1970s due to the advent of point-to-point super 
container ships (Merrens 1988). As industry drifted away from the waterfront during 
the early 1960s, the waterfront became increasingly under-utilised. By the 1970s, the 
majority of the lands that had been filled by the THC had become derelict or used for 
low rent industrial purposes (Laidley 2007). 
 
Figure 6: Derelict Post-Industrial Land in the East Bayfront 
(Photograph by the author, 2011) 
 
View looking west along Parliament Street towards Queens Quay East and the Corus 
Building demonstrating the scale and character of the post-industrial land on Toronto’s 
waterfront and the proximity of this land to the city’s downtown core (note the CN Tower in the 
background, approximately 2km away in the Central Waterfront). 
 
2.3 Post-industrialisation redevelopment visions 
 
Successive waterfront redevelopment plans were generated during the 1960s and 
early 1970s by various levels of government, including the THC, as well as private 
sector landowners (Filion and Sanderson 2011). One of the more ambitious ideas, 
produced by a consortium of Canadian railway companies, proposed a massive 
mixed-use office and residential development with a large pyramid acting as its 
centrepiece (Sewell 1993). Another, called Harbour City and proposed by the 
region’s metropolitan planning commission, suggested that the Toronto Island Airport 
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be transformed into a ‘futuristic’ mixed-use neighbourhood (Filion and Sanderson 
2011). 
 
Figure 7: Unrealised Visions for Toronto’s Waterfront 
(Images from: Flack, 2010, p. 1) 
 
Project Toronto, proposed by Buckminister Fuller (1964) on land owned by CN and CP 
railways between the city’s downtown core and the waterfront, imagined a mega-structure 
and tower (now the approximate location of the CN Tower), a waterfront university centred 
around a pyramid and a series of man-made residential islands in the Inner Harbour. 
 
Harbour City was proposed in 1968 and imagined a series of interlinked residential islands on 
the land that is now occupied by the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport on the western edge of 
the Central Waterfront. 
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None of these visionary plans were ever realised, although one proposal made by 
the federal government did garner a lot of public support. During the 1972 federal 
election campaign the governing Liberal Party promised to transform 35 hectares of 
the waterfront into an urban park (Gordon 1994; Filion and Sanderson 2011). While 
some viewed the proposal as a cynical election ‘gift’ from the Liberals, the federal 
government argued that it was a much needed response to a large mixed-use office 
and residential development called Harbour Square that was under construction on 
the water’s edge (Desfor et al. 1989). 
 
Figure 8: Harbour Square 
(Photograph by the author, 2011) 
 
This photograph depicts the Harbour Square development located on Queens Quay 
Boulevard and overlooking Lake Ontario. Built during the 1970s, Harbour Square was 
strongly criticised for its size, bulk and relationship with the public realm. 
 
The federal government described the Harbour Square development as the first part 
of a potential ‘ceramic curtain’ of high-rise buildings along the lakefront and 
characterised its efforts to construct a public park as saving the waterfront for the 
citizens of Toronto (Desfor et al. 1989). Despite this assertion, the federal 
government’s motives remained ambiguous because the Harbour Square 
development was proposed by a developer with close ties to the THC, itself a federal 
agency. The THC had given its support to the development because it saw a “golden 
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opportunity to launch a post-industrial redevelopment strategy and raise badly 
needed income to subsidise its port and airport operations” (Filion and Sanderson 
2011, 83). In addition, pro-development councillors at the City of Toronto had 
approved the project even though it appeared to go against various emerging plans 
for the waterfront (ibid.). 
 
2.4 Indecision and inactivity on the waterfront 
 
The federal government achieved very little on the waterfront during the 1970s and 
Desfor et al. (1989) record that the period was marked by “indecision and an 
apparent lack of direction” (496). No progress was made with the park plan and 
following a drawn out cycle of discussions between politicians from different levels of 
government, as well as a poorly organised public participation effort, the federal 
government decided to create a Crown Corporation to directly oversee its waterfront 
redevelopment efforts (Gordon 1996). The federal government anticipated that the 
new semi-independent agency, called Harbourfront Corporation, would act like a 
private sector developer and carry out the government’s mandate more freely and 
efficiently (Desfor et al. 1989). 
 
In 1978, Harbourfront Corporation released a Development Framework that 
proposed a mixed-use residential and retail scheme with various social housing 
options, acres of open space, programmed recreation areas and a supporting 
cultural arts programme to attract visitors to the waterfront (Filion and Sanderson 
2011). Although the government provided the corporation with $25 million in start up 
costs, it was expected to fund the remainder of its ambitious programme through 
private sector land sales and development. Industrial land remediation, infrastructure 
improvements and the cost of running its successful cultural programmes caused 
expenditures at Harbourfront Corporation to spiral during the early 1980s (Desfor et 
al. 1989; Gordon 1996). To compensate, the corporation increasingly relied on 
private sector development projects to cover its operating budget and allowed its 
development partners to stray from the original urban design framework for the area. 
Densities increased, the large waterfront park was never realised and the concept of 
a mixed-use community was replaced with luxury condominiums and high rent 
commercial office space (Desfor et al. 1989). 
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Figure 9: Development on the waterfront during the 1980 and early 1990s 
(Photographs by the author, 2011) 
 
View of Queens Quay Boulevard, the principle waterfront street on Toronto’s waterfront, 
looking east towards Harbour Centre. The form of development approved in the 1980s 
created a barren and inhospitable public realm with little definition of the street. 
 
This image shows the Radisson Hotel. The building is accessed from Queens Quay and is 
typical of the form and style of architecture approved on the waterfront during the 1980s. The 
heavy concrete colonnade and reflective blue glass give the building an inward-facing 
appearance. 
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By the late 1980s the rapidly increasing number of private sector development 
projects on the waterfront was generating intense public dissatisfaction and, as more 
high-density towers were constructed, it became clear that the federal government’s 
promise to break the ‘ceramic curtain’ of buildings on the waterfront would not be met. 
Recognising that any on-going redevelopment efforts were politically untenable, both 
the federal government and the City of Toronto placed a moratorium on development 
and, by 1990, unable to fully fund its cultural programs and carry out its 
responsibilities for land remediation and infrastructure, the Harbourfront Corporation 
was formally disbanded (Gordon 1996; Filion and Sanderson 2011). The one 
surviving element of Harbourfront Corporation is the arts and cultural programme, 
which operates from a multi-purpose venue on the waterfront. The federal 
government rebranded this component of the corporation ‘Harbourfront Centre’ and 
since 1991 it has operated as a not-for-profit arts venue (Harbourfront Centre 2012) 
and now incorporates an upgraded public realm that was funded by the federal 
government and constructed in 2005. 
 
Figure 10: Harbourfront Centre  
(Photographs by the author, 2013) 
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The Harbourfront Centre located between Queens Quay Blvd and the Inner Harbour at the 
foot of Simcoe Street on the Central Waterfront. This image depicts one of the open-air 
theatre spaces that forms part of the popular complex. 
 
The new water’s edge promenade and boardwalk, completed in 2005, uses a palette of 
simple materials to provide a coherent and elegant scheme that provides various organic 
spaces for people to use in their own personal way. 
 
2.5 The Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront 
 
The Federal Government replaced the Harbourfront Corporation with a blue ribbon 
commission called the Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront in 
the late 1980s. David Crombie, a popular former mayor of Toronto who had gained a 
reputation as an advocate of “reasonable development” (Laidley 2007, 263) during 
the 1970s, was appointed as commissioner. Following a wide ranging public 
participation process, the Royal Commission released a report in 1992 titled 
Regeneration (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront 1992) that 
argued for an environmentally sensitive, yet economically driven, approach to 
planning and redevelopment. 
 
With the Commission’s work complete, a new Waterfront Trust was established in its 
place. Crombie stayed on to head the Trust and aimed to move the Royal 
Commission’s vision forward by actively promoting a diversity of uses on the 
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waterfront (Laidley 2007). The Trust was given a seven-year mandate and hosted 
numerous public meetings and forums to discuss the future of the waterfront. During 
this period it successfully reinforced the environmental message that had emerged 
from the Royal Commission report, yet the Trust had limited power to implement the 
vision and plans it had developed, primarily because, in 1994, much of the land on 
the waterfront was transferred from the federal THC to the City of Toronto’s 
Economic Development Corporation (TEDCO) (Filion and Sanderson 2011). Very 
little development occurred on Toronto’s waterfront during the 1990s and progress 
appeared indefinitely stalled. 
 
Figure 11: Regeneration vision for the Port Lands 
(Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront 1992, 253) 
 
One of the most ambitious ideas contained in the Royal Commission’s Regeneration report 
was the proposal to ‘renaturalisation’ the Don River Mouth. As this visualisation illustrates, the 
Commission imagined the creation of a wetlands environment with medium-rise development 
on the water’s edge. 
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3. Coordinating a design and management vision for the waterfront, 1999-2000 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The following three sections of the paper explore how a design-led waterfront 
redevelopment process evolved on Toronto’s waterfront between 1999 and 2006. 
This chronology is summarised in Figure 13 (see below), which highlights the 
planning and design documents, administrative decisions and financial commitments 
that have shaped the current phase of waterfront development. The announcement 
and impact of a waterfront-focused bid for the 2008 Olympic Games is catalogued in 
this first section. The section further evaluates the urban design vision and 
development management plan produced by a newly-created waterfront Task Force 
and considers how urban design was conceptualised during the visioning process 
and how the Task Force’s ambitious agenda for the waterfront was to be financed via 
the creation of a new redevelopment corporation. 
 
Figure 12: Timeline of decisions and plans for Toronto’s waterfront (1999-2006) 
(Diagram by the author) 
 
Administrative 
Decisions and 
Financial 
Commitments
Plans and Key 
Documents
November 1999
March 2000
July 2000
October 2000
July 2001
November 2001
Waterfront Task Force established by three 
governments in response to Olympic bid
$1.5 billion of tri-government funding pledged
Robert Fung appointed chairman of interim 
Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation
April 2001City of Toronto approves creation of interim Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation 
Our Toronto Waterfront: Wave of the Future!
(City of Toronto)
Our Toronto Waterfront: Gateway to the New Canada
(Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force)
Our Toronto Waterfront: Building Momentum
(City of Toronto)
Central Waterfront Secondary Plan: Making Waves
(City of Toronto)
Provincial Articles of Incorporation offically create
Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation 
October 2002
December 2002
Our Waterfront: Gateway to the New Canada 
Development Plan and Business Strategy
(TWRC)
Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Act 2002 
passed by Ontario Legislature
March 2003John Campbell appointed president and CEO of 
Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation
July 2004
October 2004
September 2005
December 2005
February 2006
Emergency tri-governemnt funding of 
$334 million transferred to TWRC
Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Act 2002 
ammended to allow elected officials 
to sit on TWRC board of directors
Review of Alternative Governance 
Structures and Delivery Methods 
(Mercer Delta Consulting)
West Donlands Memorandum of Understanding
(TWRC and Ontario Government)
East Bayfront Memorandum of Understanding
(TWRC, TEDCO and City of Toronto)
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3.2 The Olympic catalyst: creating a Task Force for the waterfront 
 
The current phase of redevelopment on Toronto’s waterfront can be traced to an 
ultimately unsuccessful bid for the 2008 Olympic Games that was led by a private 
sector consortium co-chaired by David Crombie soon after he stepped down from his 
role at the Waterfront Trust. In his research on Toronto’s aspirations to be an 
Olympic Games city, Oliver (2011, 774) notes that Crombie “had spent the better half 
of his adult life trying to establish a vision for Toronto’s waterfront” and, after serving 
as chair of the Royal Commission and heading the Waterfront Trust, had come to the 
conclusion that the only way to kick-start redevelopment was to “pursue a mega-
project like the Olympic Games” (ibid.) The 2008 bid for the Olympic Games has 
therefore focused firmly on the waterfront. Crombie stated in 1998 that the bid should 
principally be about “city building” (in Armstrong 1998, A8) and the connection that 
he drew between the Olympic bid and Toronto’s waterfront proved irresistible to 
political leaders who saw it as an opportunity to boost the city’s international 
exposure (Lehrer and Laidley 2008; Laidley 2011). The Olympic Master Plan 
included, not only Olympic infrastructure on the waterfront, but also a commitment to 
residential development in the eastern Port Lands and the West Don Lands, both of 
which were seen as crucial to the longer-term waterfront redevelopment initiative 
(Lorinc 2001; Oliver 2011). 
 
The energy of the Olympic bid brought the federal, provincial and municipal 
governments together in November 1999 for the unveiling of a City of Toronto report 
titled Our Toronto Waterfront: The Wave of the Future! (City of Toronto 1999) and the 
announcement of a Waterfront Redevelopment Task Force (Rusk 1999) that was to 
be charged with refining the City’s waterfront vision and reporting to City Council on 
how much it would cost and how it could be implemented through a public-private 
partnership (Lehrer and Laidley 2008). Robert Fung, a successful businessman and 
close friend of both the prime minister and the federal finance minister, Paul Martin, 
was appointed as chair of the Task Force (TWRC 5 2011). 
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Figure 13: Toronto 2008 Olympic Bid Masterplan 
(Toronto Olympic Committee, 2001, no page number) 
 
 
This image shows the initial waterfront masterplan as contained in the 2001 bid document for 
the waterfront-focused Olympic Games. Central to the plan is the concentration of Olympic 
infrastructure in the Port Lands and the creation of two new residential districts, one south of 
the main Olympic stadia (the proposed Athlete’s Village) and one to the north at the West 
Don Lands (the proposed Media Village). It is also interesting to note the continuation of the 
proposal to ‘renaturalise’ the Don River, as imagined in the Royal Commission’s 
Regeneration report (1992). Plans for the Central Waterfront appear less developed but 
propose a linear greenway along much of the water’s edge. 
 
3.3 Our Toronto Waterfront: The Wave of the Future! 
 
The Wave of the Future! opened with a ‘Disneyesque’ tone, proclaiming the 
waterfront as “The Place Where Magic Begins” and declaring that “Great cities 
dream great dreams. Great waterfronts make dreams come true” (1999, 1). It 
emphasised the need for investment from the provincial government and the private 
sector to realise the City’s ambitious vision and set out eight principles for renewal 
(summarised in Figure 14) that were predicated on an integrated urban design and 
planning vision for the waterfront – a lesson City planners had drawn from 
observations of cities in Europe and North America where vacant industrial 
waterfront land had been successfully transformed into vibrant neighbourhoods and 
destinations. Crucially, the city’s Wave of the Future report supported a waterfront-
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focused bid for the Olympic Games (Oliver 2011), but although it contained 
numerous glossy photographs it did not offer any further details on the master 
planning of the waterfront lands or prospective illustrations. As Oliver observes, the 
emphasis of the report was more towards “…the lengthy tradition of grandiose 
waterfront dreaming in the city” (2011, 779). Despite the lack of a masterplan, the 
document did list a series of environmental, transportation and urban design projects, 
including the restoration of the mouth of the Don River, removing/relocating the 
Gardiner expressway, improving Union Station, developing public spaces and major 
cultural buildings on the Central Waterfront, and transforming the underdeveloped 
Port Lands district into a mixed-use hub for leading film, ‘imagination’ and 
environmental industries.  
 
Figure 14: Core themes identified in The Wave of the Future! principles 
(Summarised from City of Toronto 1999) 
1. Environment  
An environmentally sensitive approach to waterfront renewal that restores wildlife habitats, 
improves the health of Lake Ontario, supports the removal of an elevated highway and 
encourages improvements to public transportation on the waterfront. 
 
2. Urban Design and Planning 
An emphasis on high quality urban design that demands the skills of leading architects and 
designers and includes a commitment to a “ribbon of green” (11) on the waterfront, linkages 
across the city, the promotion of mixed-use developments, housing for all needs, and the 
preservation of historical buildings. 
 
3. Economy 
An economically viable renewal strategy that encourages job growth, especially in 
“internationally-competitive imagination industries” (17), and an “Aggressive Tourist Strategy” 
(21). 
 
4. Public Engagement 
A recognition that “the waterfront belongs to the people of Toronto” (7) and a subsequent 
commitment to public engagement and consultation that introduces a series of topic-based 
advisory groups. 
 
The role envisaged for a new public-private partnership was more clearly defined. 
The City affirmed that the renewal of Toronto’s waterfront would not solely be a 
government undertaking and recognised that the private sector would be one of the 
biggest benefactors of waterfront renewal. The report sketched out a partnership that 
would employ planning and urban design to harness economic development and 
increase Toronto’s global competitive edge by creating “…a ‘virtuous cycle’ in which 
new business generates more property taxes, more property taxes lead to better 
public facilities, better public facilities attract more investment and more investment 
creates more jobs” (City of Toronto 1999, 7). 
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Curiously, the Olympic bid, although the catalyst that had brought the three 
governments together, received scant attention. Towards the beginning of the report, 
a potential waterfront-orientated Olympic Games was acknowledged but was quickly 
rendered insignificant in the face of the wider challenge of renewing the waterfront as 
a public space. Oliver (2011) notes that both the City’s chief planner Paul Bedford 
and the co-chair of the Olympic bid, David Crombie, emphasised that the report was 
the result of a longer-term planning project. Yet, from a political perspective, the 
Olympic connection was unavoidable (ibid.). Ending with the proposal to form an 
intergovernmental task force as the crucial ‘next step’, the report also outlined the 
foundations for a future development management strategy. Noting the complexity of 
land ownership and regulation on the waterfront, it stated the need for the three 
governments to unify around a shared vision and avoid repeating the “jurisdictional 
gridlock” (City of Toronto 1999, 27) that had plagued previous waterfront 
endeavours, by creating a government-owned corporation with a transparent 
governance structure, a series of core responsibilities and the powers to manage the 
coordination of the public lands on the waterfront. 
 
3.4 Robert Fung and the Task Force players 
 
Initially, the choice of Robert Fung as chair of the Waterfront Redevelopment Task 
Force appears unusual. Fung was a corporate financier and investment expert and 
had no planning and urban design experience. The rationale for appointing Fung 
becomes clearer, however, when understood in the context of the political climate. 
Elected on conservative platforms, the Ontario premier, Mike Harris, and Toronto’s 
mayor, Mel Lastman, were sympathetic to neoliberal policies and aggressively 
moulded Toronto as a pro-business competitive global city (Kipfer and Keil 2002). 
This ideological position impacted the tone of the City of Toronto’s Wave of the 
Future! report, which, by promoting closer ties between the public and private 
sectors, had set the foundation for a corporate waterfront renewal. In addition, the bid 
for the Olympics was, as mentioned earlier, a private-sector endeavour that was 
supported, rather than led, by government (Laidley 2011). 
 
Bringing Robert Fung on as chair of the waterfront Task Force fused the link between 
the public and private sector and, as one of his close advisors at the time admits, 
Fung “…had the ability to walk into each of their offices [prime minster, premier and 
mayor], which made a huge difference at Queen’s Park [the seat of the Ontario 
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provincial government], a huge difference in Ottawa, and to some extent, the City” 
(TWRC 8 2011). Commenting on his suitability for the position, the advisor reflects:  
 
He was not an urban designer. He just came clean. What 
he brought to the table was that he knew Canada well and 
he knew the world well because he travelled. He travels the 
world on a continual basis on global business. He had the 
confidence of the prime minister, he had the confidence of 
the premier and he had the confidence of the mayor 
(TWRC 8 2011). 
 
Fung was given a few short months to construct his Task Force and produce a 
costed blueprint for the redevelopment scheme based on the City’s aspirational 
Wave of the Future! report (Rusk 1999). Acknowledging his own shortcomings in 
planning and urban design management, he sought the advice of developers he 
knew in the business community including Paul Reichmann of Olympia and York, the 
Toronto development company that planned and built Canary Wharf in London 
during the 1980s. Drawing on Reichmann’s advice, Fung assembled a formidable 
design team headed by Anthony Coombes, an experienced planner and urban 
designer who had served as chief planner for the Toronto Central Area during the 
mid-1970s before going to work for Paul Reichmann at Olympia and York as vice 
president of development. In this role, Coombes oversaw the design, planning and 
development of Canary Wharf and the World Financial Center in New York (Neptis 
Foundation 2009). Supporting Coombes were a group of like-minded urban 
designers with similar exposure to high-profile master planned projects, including: 
Joe Berridge of the Toronto-based firm Urban Strategies, Michael Kirkland of The 
Kirkland Partnership, also based in Toronto, and Fred Koetter of New York urban 
design firm Koetter Kim. 
 
3.5 Our Toronto Waterfront: Gateway to the New Canada 
 
In March 2000 the Task Force released its report, titled Our Toronto Waterfront: 
Gateway to the New Canada (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force 2000). 
Known colloquially as ‘the Fung report’, it outlined an urban design vision and 
strategic management plan for the waterfront. Like the Wave of the Future!, the Fung 
report adopted a promotional tone and situated Toronto within a group of ‘elite world 
cities’ acting as economic gateways for their respective countries and competing for 
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economic dominance (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force 2000). It singled-
out Toronto’s waterfront as a spatial enabler: an untapped resource where the future 
economic viability of the city could be won or lost. “Toronto alone,” the report intoned, 
“...has been virtually inert compared to its sister cities, who are inevitably its 
competitors” (14). The planning and design vision for the waterfront contained in the 
Fung report offered a more nuanced and urbane masterplan than the one presented 
in the Olympic bid document (see Figure 13) and also augmented the broad vision 
that had been sketched out in The Wave of the Future! via six development initiatives 
(summarised in Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15: Six major development initiatives 
(Summarised from: Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force 2000) 
 
1. Building a Waterfront for Public Enjoyment 
Producing a “...place to play, work and live” (29) by developing mixed-use communities that 
will accommodate 100,000 new residents and 25,000 new jobs, creating a ‘green border’ 
(29) along the water’s edge that includes parks, boulevards, piers and promenades, 
reserving over 180 hectares of land as park space, especially in the Outer Harbour and 
coordinating development through master planning and other regulatory measures so that a 
coherent public realm is realized and an appropriate scale and character is achieved. 
 
2. Accommodating Business, Employment and New Economy 
Recognising that “...competition for the entrepreneurs and workers of the new economy is 
fierce and will only increase” (32), by extending The Wave of the Future report’s call for a 
high-tech industrial cluster in the Port Lands and creating a new ‘Convergence Centre’ 
district, that would “...help Toronto more fully realize opportunities for interaction between 
the new media and the new high-technology and knowledge-based economy” (49). 
 
3. Development Comprehensive Transportation Networks 
Achieving an “...integrated and comprehensive system of streets and public transportation” 
(33) by reconfiguring the waterfront’s street system to account for major highway removal 
(see Development Initiative 5), transforming existing waterfront streets into ‘traversable 
urban boulevards’ (34), supporting the potential expansion of Toronto’s streetcar network 
into new waterfront projects, encouraging cycle usage through design and supporting the 
expansion of the city’s rapid transportation infrastructure through improvements to Union 
Station. 
 
4. Providing a Clean Environment 
Encompassing strategies to address the environmental challenges of waterfront 
redevelopment into future plans by supporting existing initiatives to improve the water quality 
of the Don River and the Inner Harbour, remediating contaminated soils on former industrial 
lands to facilitate redevelopment, mitigating the potential for flooding through environmental 
engineering measures, including the construction of a berm and strongly supporting the 
Waterfront Regeneration Trust’s and TO-Bid’s efforts to re-naturalize the mouth of the Don 
River. 
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5. Reconfiguring and Integrating the Gardiner Expressway Corridor 
Defining the removal of the Gardiner Expressway as a primary objective for the future of the 
waterfront, both “practically and symbolically” (37) and supporting this objective by 
establishing that removal would be cost effective, demonstrating that it could be achieved 
without causing major disruption to existing transportation networks and offering a 
redistribution solution and ground-level redesign that “removes its sterilizing influence, 
eliminates the debilitating effect of the overhead structure, allows attractive new 
neighbourhoods, improves access to the core, provides important new waterfront streets 
and unifies, rather than divides, Toronto with its waterfront” (39). 
 
6. Creating a Waterfront for the 2008 Olympic Games 
Amplifying the modicum of support offered by the City of Toronto for the 2008 Olympic Bid in 
the Wave of the Future! report by supporting the infrastructure needs of the Games on the 
waterfront, including a proposal for an Athlete’s Village and multiple stadia, arguing that the 
Olympics would “provide a powerful additional impetus for revitalization efforts and a 
definitive timeline” and addressing the role Olympic stadia, and other sports facilities, could 
play in the waterfront’s post-Olympic future. 
 
 
For Robert Fung, the most important idea in the report was the role of the New 
Economy. He envisioned the waterfront as a catalyst for improving Canada’s 
standing in the global marketplace, defining it as the place for innovative business 
growth in Toronto. Fung concluded that Canada had an acute need to diversify its 
trade portfolio by increasing its global reach and reducing its reliance on cross-border 
commerce with the United States (TWRC 8 2011). The six development initiatives 
also supported the report’s more thoroughgoing masterplan. As shown in Figure 16, 
the masterplan envisaged an almost seamless integration of the waterfront with the 
existing urban form of Toronto. Despite the inclusion of Olympic infrastructure, the 
plan focused on the creation of a robust street grid and a publically-accessible linear 
edge (see Figure 17) – a stark contrast to other similar waterfront projects in North 
American and European cities that had tended towards celebratory flagship projects 
such as aquariums, art galleries and other cultural attractions (Harvey 1991; Smyth 
1994) to undergird wider redevelopment and regeneration. The Task Force’s plan 
aimed, instead, to ‘stitch’ the city and the waterfront together using traditional urban 
blocks and pedestrian-scaled streets and spaces. As one of the authors explains, “It 
was essentially bringing the city to the water and recognising that urbanising the 
waterfront was the correct response to the Toronto situation” (TORONTO 8 2011). 
The design team had many discussions about whether the waterfront should be 
turned into a large Chicago-style lakefront public park, but instead proposed that the 
city’s streets be extended to a water’s edge promenade, a design objective that was 
well-supported by the plan to remove the Gardiner Expressway. 
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Figure 16: The Central Waterfront Development Concept 
(Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force 2000, 43-44) 
 
The development concept for the Central Waterfront proposed an integrated urban design 
response. The masterplan imagines a continuation of the Toronto urban grid to the waterfront 
and continues the commitment to a linear park space along much of the waterfront shoreline 
as proposed in the Olympic bid document. The proposal to re-naturalise the Don River at 
Keating Chanel also remains, but significant changes have been made to the area around the 
main Olympic sites in the Port Lands to reduce the impact of large-scale infrastructure and to 
highlight how the area might appear after the Games. Critical to the achievement of the 
overall design vision, yet not immediately obvious due to the soft colour tones used in the 
production of the masterplan, is the removal of the Gardiner Expressway along the Central 
Waterfront. 
 
Using streets and blocks to reconnect the city with the waterfront was not a new idea, 
however. Since the late 1970s, this concept had been firmly established in planning 
statements both for the waterfront and the adjacent Railway Lands (e.g. City of 
Toronto 1978), which sit in-between the financial district and the Central Waterfront 
(see Figure 3). The City of Toronto’s 1983 proposal document for the Central 
Waterfront, for example, stated “the Central Waterfront is a valuable resource which 
should be used and developed in ways that benefit the public and bring the City and 
its waterfront closer together” (City of Toronto 1982, 13). For implementation 
purposes, the Task Force’s development concept also outlined how individual 
projects could be distributed and configured along the waterfront in manageable 
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chunks. Six major planning precincts with varying design characteristics were 
identified: The Central Harbour, The Port Lands, The Mouth of the Don River, The 
West Don Lands, Garrison Common and Exhibition District. The development 
precinct concept was also recycled, again from the 1982 City of Toronto proposal 
document for the Central Waterfront, which divided the waterfront into seven similar 
‘districts’. The design language of the six precincts is discussed in more depth in 
Section 8. 
 
Figure 17: Detailed visions for the waterfront 
(Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force 2000, p. 45 (top), p. 47 (middle) and p. 
49 (bottom)) 
 
In this conceptual sketch of the Central Waterfront, the concept of a linear waterfront public 
space is emphasised as a method to soften the negative impact of previous high-rise 
development, such as the Harbour Square towers, which are illustrated in the background of 
the image. 
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Conceptual Plan of the Port Lands Precinct 
(not to scale) 
Key:  
1. Waterfront parks 
2. Landmark site 
3. East Harbour District 
4. Olympic Aquatic Centre 
5. Olympic Stadium  
6. Cherry Beach District 
7. Outer Harbour 
8. New Lakeshore Bridge 
9. Grand Channel 
10. Convergence Centre 
11. Lake Ontario Park 
The imagined masterplan (below) streetscapes (above) for the Port Lands reinforce the 
broader urban design concept illustrated in the waterfront master plan. The images suggest 
that the precinct will be a walkable neighbourhood defined by an urban grid structure and 
perimeter building blocks. The substantial Olympic stadium sits within the grid structure and is 
defined, not by itself, but by a linear public plaza reminiscent of a classical amphitheatre. At 
street level, the public realm is reinforced by taller buildings located at strategic corners and 
by ground floor retail on the principal waterfront boulevard. 
 
Turning to the management strategy, the Fung report called for a private sector-like 
corporation to be created that would be endowed with a series of government powers 
to enable private sector development. The Task Force’s primary requests were that it 
should be given the powers to operate a streamlined and simplified planning system 
and have the capacity to raise finances independently. These requests were 
supported by a bold financial concept. The Fung report estimated that the 
infrastructure costs for the entire project, including the removal of the Gardiner 
Expressway, stood at $5.2 billion, while the cost of associated private development 
projects would come in at $7 billion. This generated a combined total of $12.2 billion 
to implement the entire vision. Proposing that the public sector cover the 
infrastructure component, the report outlined a number of methods that the three 
governments could use to generate the required revenues, including: road tolling, a 
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downtown parking surcharge, a waterfront casino and land sales/leases. Proposals 
that, ultimately, never came to pass. 
 
3.6 Making the case for a waterfront redevelopment corporation 
 
The Task Force’s proposed governance model attracted the most scrutiny from 
politicians and the press. In the Toronto Star business columnist David Crane (2000) 
questioned the corporation’s ability to be transparent and accountable to 
Torontonians when in control of so much public money. Jack Layton, a Toronto city 
councillor for the Don River ward, was reported to have stated: “I want this to be the 
people’s corporation, not a corporation of three or four guys who’ve dealt with lots of 
money all their lives and know how to move pieces around on a Monopoly board” 
(quoted in DeMara 2000, no page number). At the same time, however, the design 
vision and management plan contained in the Fung report did garner powerful 
support, both in other quarters of the press and from City of Toronto planning 
officials. A former senior planning manager at the City of Toronto recalls that the 
report “spelled out some refreshing new ideas and approaches to rethinking the 
waterfront” (TORONTO 8 2011) and noted that the proposal for a ‘Toronto Waterfront 
Redevelopment Corporation’ should be welcomed because it aimed to bring all three 
level of government together. Writing in The Globe and Mail, David Gordon (2000) 
who, as a planning academic, had published research on waterfront redevelopment 
efforts in both New York and Toronto, supported Fung’s assertion that the most 
important proposition in the Task Force report was the operational concept and its 
call for an independent corporation. He thought that “...the key financial strategy is 
not big cash grants, but granting the agency the power to borrow money, lease 
assets, and recover revenue from tolls and taxes” (A17). Gordon argued that the new 
waterfront corporation should have the power to hire the best employees possible 
and not be required to rely on government staff seconded from other government 
agencies or departments. 
 
Fung and other Task Force executives also embarked on a promotional drive to sell 
their urban design vision and waterfront redevelopment strategy to the general 
public, politicians and the private sector. During the spring and summer of 2000, they 
conducted a number of press interviews, speeches and public open houses. Fung 
addressed multiple interest groups, including a joint forum of the Canadian Urban 
Institute and the Toronto Board of Trade (Lewington 2000a) and a high-profile public 
lecture at Toronto’s Winter Garden Theatre (Barber 2000). The forums, notably 
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conducted after the report had been written, were used to highlight the role that 
urban design would play as a tool to attract new employers and professional 
employees to live and work on the waterfront. The six new precinct neighbourhoods 
were cast as exciting, vibrant enclaves replete with premium commercial services all 
within close proximity to the city’s corporate downtown core. 
 
3.7 Our Toronto Waterfront: Building Momentum 
 
The Task Force’s vision received its first official endorsement in July 2000, when 
Toronto City Council voted to approve an in-house staff analysis of the Task Force’s 
vision (City of Toronto 2000). The City’s report supported the Task Force’s waterfront 
urban design vision and redevelopment strategy, but with some important 
reservations (City of Toronto 2000a). City planners were pleased that Fung’s Task 
Force had been guided by the City’s Wave of the Future! report and supported its 
commitment to make the waterfront a nexus for Toronto’s global economy by 
endorsing the aim to use both the public realm and real estate development to attract 
innovative New Economy investors and jobs to the waterfront (City of Toronto 
2000a). 
 
The planners also stressed the many consistencies between the Task Force’s urban 
design objectives and the City’s latest Official Plan (City of Toronto 2002), which 
aimed to promote citywide urban design principles and encourage high quality 
development rather than list detailed policies and regulations as had characterised 
previous iterations of the plan. This change in approach was led by the City of 
Toronto’s planning director, Paul Bedford, who was keen to see a performance-
based, visionary policy plan that challenged existing approaches to development and 
proposed new ideas for the city. Although the controversial proposal to remove the 
Gardiner Expressway was characterised as a bold idea, it too was supported. The 
City suggested that the Task Force and the City conduct further comprehensive 
impact analyses of the highway and transportation reconfiguration proposals to 
develop the idea further. The report also proposed that the City planning department 
begin work on an expedited ‘secondary plan’2 process for the Central Waterfront that 
would align with the time constraints demanded by the Olympic Bid and build upon 
                                            
2 Secondary plans, or Part II Plans as they are also known in Toronto, are statutory planning documents that 
accompany the citywide Official Plan and provide detailed policies and principles for specific districts or 
neighbourhoods in the city. Producing a secondary plans is the responsibility of the City of Toronto. However, they 
are often produced in consultation with the landowner(s), especially if large-scale development is planned. 
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community feedback that had been collected by the Task Force shortly after its 
report was published (City of Toronto 2000a).  
 
The Task Force’s supporting financial concept was also evaluated by City planners. 
The report concluded that it was generally sound and could be achieved through the 
various financial measures proposed, including road tolling and the possible 
development of a casino. However, concerned about risk and liability, City staff 
emphasised that a financial commitment from the provincial and federal governments 
was imperative if the overall project was to have long-term viability. The City could 
not go it alone. Finally, City staff turned their attention to the Task Force’s proposal 
for an independent, ‘business-like’ corporation and outlined a number of reservations 
about the proposed devolution of powers, asking “What responsibility lies with the 
municipality and what responsibility lies with the new waterfront development 
governing body?” (80). Not finding a satisfactory answer in the Task Force’s 
operational concept, City staff recommended that additional work commence 
between the three governments to establish whether a corporate-style management 
body was the correct choice for Toronto. The report stressed the need for a ‘made in 
Toronto’ model that would address the accountability of the waterfront governing 
body, its financial structure and its ability to make sound decisions quickly with 
necessary public input. Although the City of Toronto did not offer its complete support 
for the corporation Fung envisaged, the Council vote in July 2000 gave politicians 
and City staff the green light to commence detailed discussions with the province and 
the federal governments about the scope of a waterfront governance body. It also 
gave the City’s planning department the blessing they needed to begin work on the 
new secondary plan for the Central Waterfront. 
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4. Establishing a planning framework and management structure for the 
waterfront, 2000 - 2002 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Section 4 focuses on the period between late 2000 and 2002 when various steps 
were taken by the federal, provincial and municipal governments to enact the vision 
and management proposals developed for the waterfront in 1999 and early 2000. 
The section outlines a funding commitment made by the three governments in 2000 
and explores the subsequent decision to establish a corporation called the Toronto 
Waterfront Revitalisation Corporation (TWRC) to implement the design and planning 
vision for the waterfront. The section also documents the form, content and reception 
of the City of Toronto’s official planning framework for the waterfront that was 
released to coincide with the creation of the waterfront corporation. 
 
4.2 $1.5 billion for waterfront revitalisation 
 
In October 2000, the federal, provincial and municipal governments made a shared 
$1.5bn funding pledge for the waterfront (Byres and Greenwood 2000; City of 
Toronto 2001), with each level of government contributing $500 million to the Task 
Force’s redevelopment programme. The governments hoped that this promise would 
send a clear signal to the International Olympic Committee that Toronto was serious 
about being a host city for the 2008 games (Reguly 2000). However, the amount fell 
far short of that envisages by Fung and the Task Force. They had estimated that a 
public sector commitment of at least $5 billion was required (Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization Task Force 2000) and were concerned that the money might be 
apportioned to projects associated with the Olympic bid rather than the broader 
redevelopment vision and management strategy.  
 
The Task Force’s concern about the nature of the funding pledge were confirmed 
early the following year when the three governments jointly announced that the first 
$300 million of their shared contributions would be used to fund four Olympic bid 
priority projects: extending Front Street, expanding platforms and passenger 
corridors at the Union Subway Station, completing the first phase of environmental 
remediation on the Port Lands and carrying out an environmental assessment of the 
Don River mouth proposal (City of Toronto 2001). 
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4.3 Formation of the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation 
 
A month later, at the end of April 2001, Toronto City Council approved the formation 
of an interim ‘Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation’ (City of Toronto 2001a) 
and in July the three governments jointly nominated Robert Fung as the corporation’s 
first chair (Rusk 2001). Remarkably, Fung’s nomination occurred only two weeks 
after Toronto ultimately lost out to Beijing in its bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games 
(Lewington 2001). For supporters of the Task Force this proved a pivotal moment in 
the saga of Toronto’s waterfront redevelopment because the three governments had 
kept to their promise and ultimately supported the ambitious project despite the 
disappointing Olympics result. Articles of Incorporation for the new TWRC were 
drawn up in 2001 and approved via an act of the provincial legislature in December 
2002 (Eidelman 2011). However, while Fung had achieved his goal of establishing a 
dedicated organisation to implement his Task Force’s ideas, it was not the 
independent corporation he had championed.  
 
The federal and provincial governments shared the City’s concerns about the power 
of a fully independent corporation (see Section 3) and decided not to relinquish total 
control of the waterfront planning process to such a body (Oliver 2011). Therefore, 
the provincial act of incorporation did not actually award the TWRC with the power to 
implement the mandate handed to it by the three governments (Eidelman 2011). 
Under the legislation, the waterfront corporation was unable to make decisions about 
land and financing, including mortgaging, buying land, or borrowing money, without 
the separate permission of all three levels of governments. Specifically, the Act 
required the TWRC to seek its funding via contribution agreements one project at a 
time, which has left it “financially vulnerable to bureaucratic delays (Eidelman 2011, 
278). Senior corporation officials share Eidelman’s conclusions and, as one recalls, 
“We got the money, but we never got any authority.…So, the land was never 
controlled by us, but in our enabling legislation we are identified as the master 
developer, so one would think we should have been the master developer (TWRC 3 
2011). The powers requested by the Task Force were not dissimilar to those 
awarded to the Toronto Harbour Commissioners by the federal government in the 
early twentieth century (see Section 2) and the three levels of government agreed 
that it would be political untenable to create such a powerful organisation again 
(Oliver 2011). The City of Toronto, in particular, was eager to avoid loosing control of 
the waterfront planning process to an agency of the provincial and federal 
government. 
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4.4 Making Waves: A planning framework for Toronto’s waterfront 
 
To coincide with the formation of the TWRC, the City of Toronto released a 
secondary plan for the waterfront in October 2001. Titled “Making Waves: Principles 
for Building Toronto’s Waterfront” the plan was written in partnership with the Task 
Force and thus tied together the planning work conducted in the Wave of the Future!, 
the Fung report, the Building Momentum document and the Olympic bid. As a core 
component of Toronto’s plan hierarchy and a ‘Part II’ component of the City of 
Toronto Official Plan (2002), Making Waves provided the new corporation with a 
legal basis for waterfront redevelopment. Albeit very similar to the Task Force’s 
vision for the waterfront, Making Waves did mark a radical departed from the format 
of previous secondary plans produced by the City of Toronto. To fulfil the objectives 
of the citywide Official Plan, secondary plans had traditionally prescribed very 
detailed land use regulations and invariably listed planning and urban design 
stipulations for each land parcel in the secondary plan area together with simple 
interpretive maps.  
 
To compliment the wider changes to the Official Plan, described in Section 3, the City 
was determined to move away from this format and produce a more visionary 
performance-based plan that would facilitate the TWRC’s redevelopment process 
rather than directly control it (TORONTO 8 2011). Making Waves was thus a glossy 
and colourful publication complete with photography, visionary plans and three-
dimensional visualisations (see Figures 18 and 20). In much the same way as the 
Wave of the Future! and the Fung report, Making Waves had the feel of a marketing 
brochure for the waterfront rather than a municipal regulatory document; the familiar 
language of urban competition had been transported into the plan’s opening 
statements and there was little to no alteration to the urban design vision and 
strategy tendered by the Task Force. 
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Figure 18: Making Waves Public Realm Plan 
(City of Toronto 2001, 38-39) 
 
The public realm plan was broadly similar to the development concept outlined in the Fung 
report (see Figure 16). The commitments to a linear waterfront public space, the 
renaturalisation of the Don River and the removal of the Gardiner Expressway were all 
retained. The Olympic infrastructure proposed for the Port Lands were removed (following the 
failed bid) and detailed neighbourhood block configurations were no longer provided for the 
East Bayfront, West Don Lands and the Port Lands. This suggests that further detailed 
design work was to be reserved for the subsequent precinct planning processes. 
 
4.5 Principles for Building Toronto’s Waterfront 
 
The secondary plan outlined the planning and urban design implementation strategy 
that was to be carried out by the City of Toronto in partnership with the newly created 
TWRC. Four ‘Core Principles’ sat at the heart of the plan and condensed the six 
development initiatives identified in the Fung report (see Figure 15). These principles 
were outlined in conjunction with a series of ‘Big Moves’ that were identified as the 
key ways to realise the vision for the waterfront (City of Toronto 2001). The ‘Big 
Moves’ made reference to specific streets and sites along the waterfront and used 
visualisation tools to demonstrate how different proposals might be achieved. The 
goal was to show the depth of the public sector’s commitment to the waterfront and 
to assure the private sector that the waterfront was a safe, and even formidable, 
investment opportunity (see Figure 19). 
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Figure 19: Central Waterfront Core Principles and Big Moves 
(Summarised from: City of Toronto 2001, 23-45) 
1. Removing Barriers/Making Connections 
Bringing Toronto to the waterfront by removing barriers and reconnecting “the city with Lake 
Ontario and the lake with the city” (24). Six ‘Big Moves’ proposed:  
• (A1) Redesigning the Gardiner corridor and removing elevated expressway when 
improvements to other networks completed;  
• (A2) Extending and improving the existing public transportation network;  
• (A3) Reimagining Lake Shore Boulevard as a generously landscaped boulevard;  
• (A4) Creating a scenic Waterfront Drive along Queen’s Quay; 
• (A5) Completing the Waterfront Trail that along Lake Ontario; and  
• (A6) Enforcing the unique identity of historic corridors on the waterfront. 
2. Building a Network of Spectacular Waterfront Parks and Public Spaces 
Recognising the importance of public spaces on the waterfront and promoting it as a 
destination for local people, tourists and businesses alike. Ten ‘Big Moves’ proposed, 
including:  
• (B7) Reserving the Water’s Edge for public use;  
• (B10) Crating a new waterfront park at East Bayfront; 
• (B11) Creating a scenic greenway through the Port Lands to link existing parks; and,  
• (B13) Transforming the existing Port Lands Ship Canal into a powerful focus point; 
3. Promoting a Clean and Green Environments 
Aiming to achieve a “high level of environmental health in the Central Waterfront” (40) and 
creating sustainable waterfront communities. Three ‘Big Moves’ proposed:  
• (C17) Promoting sustainable modes of transportation; 
• (C18) Constructing a flood protection berm to protect the West Don Lands; and,  
• (C19) Renaturalising the Mouth of the Don River. 
4. Creating Dynamic and Diverse New Communities 
Creating communities that will one day be “acclaimed for their high degree of social, 
economic, natural and environmental health and cultural vibrancy” (44). Four ‘Big Moves’ 
proposed:  
• (D20) Opening up the Port Lands for redevelopment to support the New Economy; 
• (D21) Redevelop the West Don Lands into a mix-used community;  
• (D22) Transform the East Bayfront into a prominent waterfront community; 
• (D23) Expand Exhibition Place into a dynamic destination that includes housing and 
employment space. 
 
Adopting the Task Force’s term ‘precincts’ to identify areas of opportunity on the 
waterfront, Making Waves also detailed a series of strategic ‘precinct plans’ that 
would sit below the secondary plan. Discussed in more detail in Section 7, the 
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precinct plans were a new tool in the City of Toronto planning hierarchy, and were 
described in the following terms: 
 
The precinct development strategies will deal with street 
and block patterns and building heights, urban design, 
community services and facilities including schools and 
local parks, and a strategy for achieving affordable housing 
targets in the Central Waterfront. The precinct development 
strategies will also address business relocation 
requirements and financing options (City of Toronto 2001, 
21). 
 
Reflecting the sentiment of the tri-government agreement and clearly marking the 
boundaries between the City and the corporation, the secondary plan stated that the 
City remained the approving planning authority on the waterfront, while the new 
corporation would be responsible for producing a business plan that reflected the 
planning and design vision in the plan. 
 
Figure 20: Making Waves detailed design proposals  
(City of Toronto 2001, extracted from pages 23-46) 
 
Three-dimensional computer visualisations were used in the Making Waves secondary plan 
to illustrate the Core Principles and ‘Big Moves’. The image above illustrates the potential 
boulevard street environment that would be created on Lakeshore Boulevard should the 
Gardiner Expressway be removed from above it. 
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This view of the Port Lands Ship Canal 
proposes a mid-rise neighbourhood in the 
Port Lands with a central ‘scenic greenway’. 
The mid-rise block forms are similar to those 
proposed in the Fung report (see Figure 17). 
This view of the East Bayfront illustrates one 
of the ‘Big Moves’ and proposes that much of 
the site at the water’s edge be reserved for 
public space (both exterior and interior), with 
medium rise buildings facing an upgraded 
Queens Quay. 
4.6 The release of Making Waves and its reception 
 
Like the Task Force report before it, Making Waves was well received by the press. 
The Toronto Star remarked that “City planners did get it right. Their report...lays a 
solid foundation for the creation of a waterfront that will be open, accessible and 
inviting to all residents” and went on to conclude that the plan reaffirmed “the 
important principle that Toronto Council have authority over planning decisions” 
(2001, A26). Planning and urban design professions also applauded the secondary 
plan. In May 2002, the Canadian Institute of Planners presented the City of Toronto 
with its ‘Award of Excellence’ citing the plan’s innovation, potential and presentation 
(Canadian Institute of Planners 2011) and, later that same year, the international 
Waterfront Center bestowed their prestigious ‘2002 Excellence on the Waterfront 
Award’ upon the City (The Waterfront Center 2011). 
 
4.7 Opportunities for public consultation and review 
 
After a period of public consultation and review, the secondary plan was adopted by 
Toronto’s City Council in April 2003 (City of Toronto 2003). Lehrer and Laidley (2008) 
highlight that the City of Toronto undertook only a limited amount of public 
consultation during the secondary plan process and, much like the public forums 
convened after the publication of the Fung report, the opportunities for genuine public 
input were minimal. A community leader with a long history of involvement in 
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waterfront consultation on Toronto’s waterfront recalls that “we were presented with a 
draft plan. It was written. It was done. You could comment on it, but really: how much 
was going to be changed?” (CIVIL 2 2011). Using Sherry Arnstein’s ‘Ladder of 
Citizen Participation’ (1969), Lehrer and Laidley characterise the consultation efforts 
that took place as ‘tokenistic’ and argue that the City chose to sell the Task Force’s 
ambitious scheme to the community via the secondary plan process rather than 
directly involve members of the public in its creation (2008). In a separate paper, 
Laidley (2011) goes further and argues that the publication of Making Waves caused 
the lines between the private sector Task Force and the public planning process for 
the waterfront to blur because many of the same authors worked on the Fung report 
and the secondary plan, meaning that the content was, in effect, translated from 
document to document. Laidley’s assessment is confirmed by the recollections of 
senior Task Force designers and a senior planning manager at the City of Toronto, 
all three of whom worked on the report. The planning manager openly admits that, “I 
saw an opportunity to take those ideas and translate them into principles” 
(TORONTO 8 2011), while one of the Task Force urban designers dogmatically 
asserts that the City of Toronto “...produced a secondary plan that accorded with the 
book [the Fung report]” (TWRC 5 2011). “It was a communal effort to put that thing 
together” (DESIGN 10 2011), remembers the other Task Force urban designer. 
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5. A faltering start for waterfront design and redevelopment, 2002 - 2006 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
With the planning framework and management structure for the waterfront in place, 
work began on implementing the vision for the waterfront. Yet, as Section 5 now 
documents, a series of financial and political struggles faced the newly created 
TWRC between 2002 and 2006. The section therefore pays particular attention to the 
limitations of the TWRC’s governance model and the supporting funding 
mechanisms that were established by the three governments to support its 
endeavours. It examines how the corporation narrowly avoided bankruptcy and 
sought a comprehensive review of its governance structure to avert further such 
crises. The section also notes the close attention that the City of Toronto’s new 
mayor paid to the operations of the TWRC, and examines how his mayoralty became 
a central part of the city’s waterfront redevelopment story. 
 
5.2 Beginning the process of waterfront planning and management 
 
The TWRC produced a comprehensive Development Plan and Business Strategy in 
2002 that laid out a five-year implementation plan. This reiterated the familiar themes 
of global competition and the New Economy, as well as stating a clear objective to 
pursue design excellence on the waterfront by realising the ambitious proposals 
contained in the secondary plan and the Fung report. It also outlined the projects that 
would be tackled in the first five years, including: producing precinct plans for all 
areas of the waterfront, beginning the first phase of construction on the East Bayfront 
precinct, developing a centre for the New Economy in the Port Lands and 
undertaking the four short term infrastructure projects that had been singled out by 
the three governments in their initial $300 million funding allowance – despite the fact 
these projects had originally been tied to the now-defunct Olympic bid. The 
noticeable omission from the list of priority projects was the Gardiner Expressway, 
which was reserved for further study due to on-going political concerns about its 
potential removal.  
 
In March 2003, the day-to-day task of running the TWRC and delivering on its 
ambitious redevelopment agenda was placed in the hands of a real estate executive 
called John Campbell. Campbell was recommended for the post of president and 
CEO by TWRC board chair Robert Fung and, like Fung, he had a private sector 
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background (TWRC 8 2011). Although trained as a civil engineer, Campbell had 
spent most of his career in real estate and, immediately before his appointment at 
the TWRC, had managed a number of large-scale commercial real estate projects in 
downtown Toronto as president of Brookfield Ventures Ltd. 
 
5.3 Limitations of the TWRC governance model 
 
Leading the TWRC from a planning vision into the early stages of implementation 
was going to be a formidable challenge, even for a seasoned real estate operative 
like John Campbell. As discussed in Section 4, the three governments had pledged 
contributions of $500 million each towards the waterfront’s redevelopment in October 
2000. But, at the time of Campbell’s appointment in March 2003, very little of that 
money had actually been transferred. The contribution agreement funding model 
meant that the TWRC had to apply each year for specific sources of money to fund 
individual development projects (Mercer Delta Consulting 2004) and, while this 
method allowed the governments to stay attuned to the spending priorities of the 
waterfront corporation, it created cash flow problems in its early years of operation. 
 
A changing political environment was somewhat to blame for this. In 2002 the 
leadership of the City of Toronto government shifted. Mayor Mel Lastman, a right-
leaning politician who had helped set up the TWRC, was replaced by the more left-
wing administration of Mayor David Miller. Miller won the mayoralty, in part, because 
of his opposition to a widely unpopular proposal for a bridge connecting the 
waterfront with Toronto Island Airport (the airport was served by a ferry) (Lewington 
2003). Waterfront residents were concerned that a ‘fixed link’ would improve the 
viability of the airport, thus increasing aviation traffic and noise (Theobold 2002). 
Miller was successful in getting the fixed link to the airport cancelled (City of Toronto 
2003a). However, angered by the TWRC’s decision to support the airport expansion 
(James 2002), he began to direct his attention towards the operation of the new 
corporation. As a centre-left politician Miller was wary of the corporation’s 
detachment from the City of Toronto, despite the limited powers it had been awarded. 
One senior City Hall insider reflects how the mayor’s office perceived that the arm’s 
length corporation was set up by a centre-right administration – with whom Robert 
Fung had been close – that mistrusted municipal governance (POLITICAL 2 2011). 
Indeed, Miller took particular aim at the TWRC’s board of directors, criticising what 
he perceived as the stalled implementation of the secondary plan and, at the same 
time, questioned the composition of the corporation’s board of directors, stating:  
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Several of the corporation’s directors have inherent conflicts 
because they represent interests with their own waterfront 
agendas – power plants, theme parks, construction 
opportunities. These people should be replaced by 
visionary urban thinkers – people such as architect Jack 
Diamond, planner Ken Greenberg, thought-provoking Jane 
Jacobs or former mayor David Crombie (Miller 2002, A21). 
 
Political leadership also shifted at the provincial level. A centre-left Liberal 
government led by Dalton McGuinty replaced the right-leaning Progressive 
Conservative government of Premier Mike Harris, also one of the original partners of 
the earlier tri-government agreement. Not long after he arrived at the corporation, 
Campbell had approached the previous Progressive Conservative government and 
requested that the scope of the new corporation’s enabling legislation be 
renegotiated so that the TWRC could be more financially independent and less 
reliant on staggered contributions from the various levels of government. But, 
according to a corporation executive, a promise made by Mike Harris’ provincial 
government in early 2003 to increase the corporation’s control over financial matters 
at the end of its first year of operation was not honoured by the incoming Liberal 
administration (TWRC 7 2011). 
 
The unpredictable nature of election cycles at the three levels of governments meant 
that the TWRC faced the challenge of trying to fund the implementation of their long-
term vision for the waterfront while justifying their funding requests on the basis of 
short-term implementation successes (TWRC 7 2011). By early 2004 the cash flow 
problems facing the TWRC reached a point of no return. Only $35 million of the 
pledged $1.5 billion had actually been transferred to the corporation (Filion and 
Sanderson 2011) and a number of the governments’ future funding commitments 
were directed towards the projects highlighted in the secondary plan which related to 
the failed waterfront Olympic Bid, but were not under the purview of the corporation, 
such as a heavy rail connection from downtown Toronto to the city’s Pearson 
International Airport and upgrades to subway platforms at the nearby Union Station. 
This lack of stable government funding forced the TWRC to reveal in March 2004 
that it was nearly bankrupt. To avert a crisis, the federal government provided a small 
bridging payment in March 2004 that allowed the corporation to continue paying its 
staff (Lewington 2004) and then, after considerable lobbying and further negative 
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press reports, the three governments eventually committed a further $334 million in 
late July 2004. This injection provided the corporation with the medium-term stability 
it required. 
 
The corporation’s renewed financial stability did not end the growing criticisms of its 
governance structure. Mayor Miller continued to offer assessments of the TWRC’s 
ability to operate effectively and, as the funding crisis intensified during the summer 
of 2004, he reiterated his earlier concerns about the composition of the board of 
directors. Miller’s solution was that politicians should be allowed to serve as board 
members (Gillespie 2004), a condition expressly prohibited in the corporation’s 
enabling legislation because of concerns about overt politicisation (Ontario 2002). 
More specifically, he argued that the waterfront’s redevelopment should be more 
clearly identified as a municipal project, a position motivated by the heavy handling of 
the fixed link debate by the federally controlled Toronto Port Authority. In November 
2004, Miller went a step further and proposed that he would like to sit on the 
corporation’s board of directors as the City of Toronto’s representative (James 2004). 
 
5.4 Governance and financing review 
 
The combination of Mayor Miller’s public calls for changes at the TWRC and the 
fragility of the corporation’s funding model highlighted just how vulnerable the 
corporation was to the short-term political priorities of the three governments. 
Realising that a longer-term solution was needed, the board of directors 
commissioned an independent review of its governance structure and financing 
model (TWRC 2005). Produced by management consulting firm Mercer Delta and 
published in October 2004, the review identified a disconnect between the original 
vision for the TWRC as an ‘empowered development corporation’ and the actual 
reality of its day-to-day operations. Recasting the corporation as a ‘coordinating 
agency’, Mercer Delta concluded that the TWRC did not have “sufficient power to 
compel alignment among stakeholder efforts and/or advance the development of the 
waterfront” (Mercer Delta Consulting 2004, 3). The review attributed this to a lack of 
political will on the part of the three governments, a lack of collaboration between 
stakeholders – especially other government agencies – and an inadequate supply of 
capital. Yet the review also accepted that the TWRC, as a special purpose 
corporation, walked a thin-line between independence and public accountability. 
Mercer Delta suggested that, while the concept of a fully ‘empowered corporation’ 
was theoretically sound, the conditions for such a model appeared to be untenable. 
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The report deduced that one of the biggest roadblocks to change was the 
unwillingness of the three governments to cede control of land they already held on 
the waterfront. Although in some parts of the waterfront over 80% of the land was 
owned by the public sector, it was controlled by different government agencies, 
including: the provincial Ontario Realty Corporation, the municipal Toronto Economic 
Development Corporation (TEDCO) and the federal Toronto Port Authority (TPA). As 
separate organisations with widely differing mandates, there was little appetite on the 
part of the three governments to consolidate their individual holdings through the 
tripartite corporation. Furthermore, the City of Toronto was not prepared to grant 
planning powers to an independent entity in fears that this would undermine its 
citywide planning decision-making powers (City of Toronto 2000a).  
 
Figure 21: Waterfront landownership in 2000 
(Diagram produced by the author using data from Toronto Waterfront Revitalization 
Task Force, 2000) 
 
 
The review argued for some version of an ‘empowered corporation’ model tailored to 
the Toronto waterfront context, and proposed that the waterfront corporation be given 
the power to “direct the use of lands on the waterfront in accordance with the 
comprehensive plan and timelines whether or not ownership of the land is actually 
transferred to the corporation” (Mercer Delta Consulting 2004, 5). To guarantee the 
smooth implementation of specific development projects under this model, the report 
suggested that a series of separate ‘memorandums of understanding’ be drawn up 
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between government agencies to “ensure alignment and commitment to the 
comprehensive plan for waterfront revitalization” (5). One of the key 
recommendations was that the corporation be permitted to mortgage lands owned by 
the three governments and have the right to establish subsidiary companies, thus 
spreading the corporation’s financial risk – the very powers the Task Force had 
sought four years before (Eidelman 2011). Mercer Delta argued that such a move 
would minimise further government contributions because the profits from early 
development project could then be reinvested in TWRC operations. In the 
management consultant’s estimation the success of an empowered development 
corporation ultimately hinged on an improved working relationship between the three 
governments and the TWRC. Using evidence from other waterfront cities, the review 
argued that the three governments had to stop acting independently and agree to 
work together. One possible way of doing this, it suggested, was to allow elected 
officials to sit on the corporation’s board of directors, as proposed by Mayor Miller. 
But Mercer Delta only gave lukewarm support for the idea, noting “there is concern 
about the potential politicization of the Board through the appointment of elected 
officials to the Board, as suggested by the City, even though it is recognized that the 
City’s support is critical to success” (2004, 20). 
 
When the Mercer Delta review was released by the waterfront corporation in late 
October 2004 it received a mixed response. At City Hall, Mayor Miller greeted it with 
enthusiasm. He talked animatedly about giving the corporation more power to 
implement the shared planning and design vision for the waterfront, while at the 
same time, improving the conditions for public oversight through the appointment of 
politicians to the board of directors. The reception of the review by the provincial and 
federal governments was less steadfast. Reporting for The Globe and Mail, municipal 
affairs correspondent Jennifer Lewington (2004a) noted that both governments 
remained wary of appointing politicians to the TWRC board and the federal 
government, in particular, did not look favourably upon ceding additional financial 
powers to the corporation. 
 
5.5 Partial implementation of the governance and financing review 
 
The only permanent change that was made to the corporation’s primary legislation as 
a result of the review was an amendment to allow the mayor of Toronto to sit on the 
board of directors (Eidelman 2011), a surprising decision considering both the 
cautious language Mercer Delta had used to describe the proposal and the lack of 
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support it received from the provincial and federal governments. Reflecting on 
Miller’s appointment to the board, a senior TWRC executive notes that the mayor’s 
high profile was always going to be a double-edge sword for the corporation. While 
his passion and advocacy for the waterfront had its benefits, the challenge presented 
by his undue level of influence – in comparison to other board members – meant the 
corporation was always sensitive to the charge that he might become a ‘super 
director’ (TWRC 7 2011).  
 
Although the waterfront corporation was not awarded any of the enhanced financial 
powers it sought, Mercer Delta’s suggestion that a series of memoranda of 
understanding be drawn up to clarify the corporation’s role as the lead developer of 
the waterfront was heeded. While negotiations were protracted, the first 
memorandum was signed with the TWRC by the Ontario Ministry of Public 
Infrastructure Renewal and the Ontario Realty Corporation in September 2005 and 
transferred responsibility for the West Don Lands to the corporation (Ontario 2005). A 
second memorandum followed in February 2006 as an agreement between the City 
of Toronto, its economic development agency, TEDCO, and the TWRC with respect 
to landownership at East Bayfront and the Port Lands. This transferred most, but not 
all, of the land held by TEDCO to the TWRC (City of Toronto 2006). In what was 
widely seen as a step forward, the memoranda “confirmed the TWRC’s role as the 
lead planning and coordinating body responsible for waterfront lands” (Eidelman 
2011, 278) and vastly improved the TWRC’s ability to operate on the waterfront, 
facilitating, in the words of the corporation’s Annual Report 2006/07, “a more 
streamlined and focused approach as…lands are prepared for development” 
(Waterfront Toronto 2007, 2). 
 
5.6 Shifting leadership at the TWRC 
 
Mayor Miller’s election to the TWRC board of directors in late 2005 began a transition 
for Robert Fung, who had been chair of both the original Task Force, and then the 
corporation, since 1999. From the time of the Toronto Island Airport debate in 2002, 
when then-Councillor Miller had first become interested in the waterfront’s 
redevelopment, Miller and Fung had tended to view the political and jurisdictional 
issues impacting the TWRC differently. Miller had vehemently opposed the fixed link 
bridge to the airport, an issue that helped propel him to the mayoralty, while Fung 
had supported it. Moreover, before he joined the board, Miller often criticised the 
corporation and argued that the City of Toronto should play a far greater role in the 
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waterfront redevelopment process. In contrast, since the earliest days of the Task 
Force, Fung had been convinced that the corporation should be completely 
independent from government and have its own planning decision-making powers. 
Ultimately, as a senior TWRC executive with close ties to Robert Fung reports, 
“Miller and Fung never saw eye-to-eye…Miller wanted to come on the board and 
Fung did not want Miller on the board” (TWRC 8 2011). Fung’s term as chair expired 
in May 2006 and was not renewed. The decision was both personal and political. 
While the political realities of the day made it impossible for him to continue as chair, 
Fung had played a significant, and at times singlehanded, role in shaping the 
revitalisation program. While he had initially been viewed as a surprising choice – a 
successful businessman with ties to the prime minister but with no planning or design 
experience – he left behind a lasting legacy, in the form of functioning developing 
corporation, a clear planning and design vision and, as Section 9 will discuss, an 
emergent commitment to public consultation. 
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6: Establishing the conditions for a design-sensitive practice? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This section turns away from the chronological timeline that saw the TWRC placed in 
charge of Toronto’s waterfront redevelopment programme and considers in more 
detail how the corporation has endeavoured to govern planning and design on 
Toronto’s waterfront within the context of a limited governance mandate and the City 
of Toronto’s statutory planning and zoning framework. The section establishes the 
foundation for a more detailed focus on the governance of design via specific tools 
and mechanisms: the precinct planning process (Section 7), peer design review 
(Section 8), and public participation and engagement (Section 9). 
 
6.2 A delivery vehicle for design-led waterfront revitalisation? 
 
The failure of the three governments to commit to all of the governance reforms 
outlined in the Mercer Delta review discussed in Section 5 signalled that the TWRC 
needed to find innovative ways to ensure that its planning and design goals could be 
realised. As a senior TWRC executive drily notes, “What we have done…we have 
done in spite of the governance model” (TWRC 7 2011). Although the 2002 enabling 
legislation did not furnish the corporation with the planning decision-making power 
many private sector decision-makers had hoped for, the two memoranda of 
understanding that followed did define the corporation as the ‘lead master planner’ of 
the waterfront lands. This designation was also supported by a 2004 endorsement by 
the City of Toronto Council that stated: “The TWRC is the delivery vehicle for 
waterfront revitalization. All revitalization initiatives will be conducted under its 
auspices and entities charged with implementing specific waterfront projects will do 
so under service or delivery agreements with TWRC” (City of Toronto 2004, 3). Yet, 
even the memoranda of understanding left some room for ambiguity with respect to 
landownership. The agreement reached in the East Bayfront memorandum, in 
particular, was severely tested in the years that followed. It allowed TEDCO to retain 
ownership over a small land parcel within the East Bayfront precinct (City of Toronto 
2006) and, in what would become a major frustration for the TWRC, TEDCO 
developed a design proposal for the site that was directly at odds with the 
corporation’s wider vision for the East Bayfront precinct (see Section 8).  
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6.3 Controlling for ‘design excellence’ 
 
‘Design excellence’ had been embedded in the vision for Toronto’s waterfront since 
the formation of the Task Force in 1999. However, as the earlier sections ofthis 
paper discussed, urban design tended to be narrowly defined through an economic 
development lens. A broader definition of what urban design could mean on the 
waterfront emerged as the corporation began to refine its aims and objectives in the 
mid-2000s. A key turning point appears to be a trip that Robert Fung and John 
Campbell made to Sweden in August 2004 as part of a delegation organised by the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities. Sponsored by the federal government, the 
weeklong ‘Community Energy Planning Mission’ incorporated a series of policy 
seminars by the Swedish government and fieldtrips to sustainable housing 
developments, ‘ecovillages’ and renewable energy projects (Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities 2004). The mission had a major impact on the way Fung and Campbell 
conceptualised the future of Toronto’s waterfront and, as a senior TWRC executive 
explains, they both returned with a desire to intertwine sustainability and design 
excellence into the coporation’s mission and make it the guiding force behind the 
implementation efforts: 
 
As you learn about what it is you are doing, these kinds of 
things crept into the core mandate. So, how do you build 
communities? How do you build a city where people can 
live and work throughout their whole life span whether they 
are rich or poor? Part of it is about the vision of the future 
and how do you prepare today to get there. Sustainability 
and design excellence – quality of life, quality of place – all 
these things have come together over the years” (TWRC 7 
2011). 
 
To progress the waterfront redevelopment programme ‘despite the governance 
model’ and acheive sustainable design excellence, the waterfront corporation 
needed to establish various tools and mechanisms to control for design quality. 
Three, in particular, have helped to emphasise the corporation’s role as ‘lead 
masterplanner’ of the waterfront. First, are the waterfront precinct plans, which were 
formalised in the waterfront secondary plan, Making Waves, and have allowed the 
corporation to guide and control the design principles for the new waterfront districts 
via a series of focused masterplans. Second, has been the establishment of a 
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discretionary urban design peer review panel to assess all planning and design 
proposals on the waterfront. And, third has been an unusually strong commitment to 
public participation that has extended well beyond the basic consultation processes 
employed during the formulation of the waterfront planning and design vision 
mentioned in Sections 3 and 4. 
 
The TWRC has used this suite of tools and mechanisms since 2003. Yet, despite the 
influence they have had upon the design, planning and management of the 
waterfront redevelopment programme, none of the measures have official statutory 
status in Ontario’s planning system. This includes the precinct plans, which, although 
initially imagined as a tertiary component of the City of Toronto Official Plan (2002) 
are not, like a secondary or ‘Part II’ plan, recognised in the provincial Planning Act 
and thus remain unenforceable. The waterfront corporation, in some instances 
working directly with the City of Toronto planning department, has taken steps to 
manoeuvre around these statutory limitations and weave its proprietary design 
control mechanisms into the official decision-making procedures operated under the 
planning act. To give status to the precinct plans, for example, the City of Toronto 
has designated various land parcels on the waterfront as special districts within the 
City of Toronto Zoning By-Law (City of Toronto 2010) and has then used the TWRC 
precinct plans as the basis for the site specific zoning by-law amendments required 
for each of the special districts. This process, which is described more thoroughly in 
the following section, has created a regulatory ‘bridge’ between the urban design 
components proposed in the precinct plans and the legally binding rules required for 
the creation of a zoning by-law amendment. 
 
The design implementation tools that support the precinct plans, such as the urban 
design peer review process and the corporation’s public participation strategy are 
empowered through the TWRC’s contractor and development partner selection 
process. Under its founding legislation, the TWRC has the authority to choose and 
contract its own design consultants and select its real estate development partners 
because the vast majority of land on Toronto’s waterfront remains in government 
hands and is thus under the direct purview of the waterfront corporation (Ontario 
2005; City of Toronto 2006). Each private developer or external design consultant 
selected to participate in the TWRC’s precinct planning efforts must apply through a 
rigorous ‘Request for Qualification (RFQ)’ and ‘Request for Proposal (RFP)’ process. 
If successful, the TWRC specifically requires the developer and/or consultant to 
participate in its public participation processes before applying for planning 
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permission from the City of Toronto. On certain projects, typically parks and open 
spaces, the TWRC also convenes a design competition to select the design team. All 
of the corporation’s design competitions are guided by detailed briefing documents 
that spell out the corporation’s planning vision and urban design principles and also 
involve a mandatory public engagement component. Moreover, the development 
proposal documents and design competition briefs state that every waterfront project 
must, in addition to passing through the standard City of Toronto planning application 
process, be subject to an evaluation by the corporation’s Waterfront Design Review 
Panel (e.g. Waterfront Toronto 2008). This stipulation is also contained in the zoning 
by-law amendments issued by the City of Toronto for the waterfront (City of Toronto 
2006a). 
 
In short, the TWRC relies on the precinct zoning by-law amendments and the 
individual legal agreements it reaches with developers and consultant design teams 
to enforce a waterfront-wide system of design control. Internal design review takes 
place before the TWRC and its development partners submit applications for 
development approval to the City of Toronto. Design peer review and public 
feedback opportunities also continue after approvals have been granted by the City 
of Toronto to ensure that the completed projects reflect the TWRC’s earlier plans and 
proposals. The diagram in Figure 22 illustrates how this complex interweaving of 
policies and procedures works in practice, beginning with the secondary plan and 
precinct planning framework and then moving to the planning, design and delivery of 
individual development projects. 
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Figure 22: Layered control of planning and design on Toronto’s waterfront 
(Diagram by the author) 
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7. The waterfront precinct plans 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This section looks in detail at the precinct plans produced on Toronto’s waterfront by 
the TWRC to guide and support the implementation of new development. The 
waterfront precinct plans broadly resemble the tool known as a ‘design-led 
masterplan,’ which is typically used to guide large-scale development and translate 
urban design policies into more site-specific or neighbourhood-level objectives (Bell 
2005; Tiesdell and MacFarlane 2007). Masterplans are often used in conjunction with 
or as a substitute to zoning and can help to provide a more design-sensitive vision 
and programme for future development (Punter 2007). At the same time, however, 
design-led masterplans have also been identified as formidable marketing tools that 
capitalise on ‘flashy’ graphics and three-dimensional graphics to generate private 
sector investment rather than focusing on social and community planning goals 
(Giddings and Hopwood 2006). In this chapter the role and form of the waterfront 
precinct plans is discussed with a particular focus on the precinct planning process 
for the East Bayfront, before the paper turns the two mechanism used to support 
their implementation: peer design review (Section 8) and community participation 
(Section 9). 
 
7.2 The waterfront precinct plans 
 
The precinct plans divide the large waterfront district into a series of focused 
redevelopment areas and translate the broad policies and principles contained in the 
waterfront secondary plan into actionable masterplans. The boundaries of the 
various precinct have changed subtly over time and since 2010 emphasis has been 
placed on the eastern waterfront because it contains by far the greatest amount of 
underdeveloped and government-controlled land. More recently, further sub-
precincts have been designated in the Lower Don Lands and Port Lands due to the 
vast size and complexity of the site and the long-term ambition to re-naturalise the 
Don River. The Central Waterfront precinct, which sits directly south of the city’s 
downtown core, has been the subject of a comprehensive public realm upgrade, 
rather than a precinct planning process, because it was mostly developed during the 
1970s and 1980s and did not contained large areas of vacant space. 
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Figure 23: The waterfront precincts in 2010  
(Diagram produced by the author using data from Waterfront Toronto 2010, 15) 
 
 
Since 2001, the TWRC has overseen the production of three precinct plans by 
external design consultants as well as a public realm master plan for the Central 
Waterfront (see: author 2015). Toronto City Council approved the first precinct plans, 
for the West Don Lands and the East Bayfront, in 2005 (City of Toronto 2005; 2005a). 
The most recent precinct plan covers the northern quadrant of the Lower Don Lands, 
now called Keating Channel, and was endorsed by the City of Toronto Council in July 
2010 (City of Toronto 2010a). A further precinct planning process for Villiers Island 
(formerly Cousins Quay), also located in the Lower Don Lands began in 2013 (Port 
Lands Acceleration Initiative 2013). 
 
Although the three completed precinct plans were produced by different design 
consultants, they share a common urban design language and incorporate many of 
the principles imagined in both Fung’s Task Force report and the waterfront 
secondary plan and, as will be discussed in Section 9, each of the precinct plans 
were informed by a public participation process. The precinct plans focus on defined 
areas of the waterfront and offer detailed guidance on the arrangement of the streets, 
blocks, building heights, public spaces and other components of the built 
environment. They all emphasise how mixed-use development might encourage 
diversity and variety and highlight how strong relationships between buildings and 
public spaces, especially at ground level, can generate a sense of place and 
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belonging. Furthermore, the three plans aim to demonstrate that early decisions 
about building height and massing, as well as the orientation of public spaces, can 
improve the challenging connections between new precincts and existing Toronto 
neighbourhoods. 
 
Figure 24: Precinct Plans for the West Don Lands and the East Bayfront 
(Top image: TWRC 2005a, 8; bottom image adapted from: TWRC 2005b, 19-35) 
 
An artist’s impression of the West Don Lands precinct with supporting renderings of the street 
environment. The aim of the masterplan was to create a strong urban edge to the city of 
Toronto as it meets the Don River (foreground). Midrise urban blocks and wide tree-lined 
streets are used to frame a semi-circular open space that incorporates a flood berm against 
the river. 
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The precinct masterplan for East Bayfront (above) and associated artist’s renderings of the 
streetscape and public spaces. Displaying a similar design language to the West Don Lands, 
but with slightly taller buildings, the masterplan employs a series of urban blocks that step 
down to the waterfront from the Gardiner Expressway (rear). Queens Quay Boulevard, which 
runs through the centre of the site, is transformed into a urban greenway, and a series of 
triangular open spaces, including Sherbourne Park in the centre, are proposed to act as view 
cones to the lake. A strong urban edge is imagined along the waterfront and incorporates a 
multi-level promenade. 
 
7.3 Translating the precinct plan principles into zoning 
 
As outlined in Section 6, the City of Toronto always intended that the precinct plans 
would act as a design-sensitive ‘bridge’ between the official, but broadly stated, 
planning policy for the waterfront contained in the secondary plan and the strict legal 
standards required as part of the zoning by-law amendment process. To achieve this, 
the City of Toronto translates the planning proposals and design principles contained 
in each precinct plan into a zoning by-law amendment. This means that the 
arrangement of blocks, the height of buildings and the provision of open space for 
each precinct is formally codified into a skeletal legal framework with full statutory 
provision. Each zoning by-law amendment also includes a series of financial 
obligations to ensure that the amenities and public infrastructure imagined in the 
precinct plans can be secured during the development process. The generous 
residential density allowances and building height limits in each precinct are 
therefore offered in exchange for a public infrastructure improvement fee; this is set 
at $69.86 per square metre in the East Bayfront precinct, for example (City of 
Toronto 2006a). Further obligations for affordable and social housing are also 
mandated in the zoning by-law amendments. In response to clear community support 
for long-term affordable housing provision in the East Bayfront precinct, the target of 
20% affordable rental housing and 5% social housing contained in the precinct plan 
(TWRC 2005b) was translated into a statutory requirement in the zoning by-law 
amendment (City of Toronto 2006a). 
 
The precinct plans and zoning by-law amendments are further supported by official 
‘plan of subdivision’ documents that codify the configuration of each land parcel 
contained within the zoning-by laws. However, to ensure that the more visionary 
ideas for the waterfront precincts are not lost under the weight of zoning by-law and 
subdivision legalese, the corporation also produces detailed urban design guidelines 
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for each precinct. The design guidelines suggest how developers might interpret the 
zoning by-law and propose various block configurations for each land parcel (TWRC 
2007). In addition, the guidelines demonstrate the success of various alternative 
solutions through an extensive bank of precedent images. The precinct urban design 
guidelines are also intended as a guide for the Waterfront Design Review Panel 
when it deliberates on individual development proposals (see Section 8). 
 
Figure 25: East Bayfront Zoning and Subdivision 
(Waterfront Toronto 2007a, 18).  
 
Plan of Subdivision Block Plan for the first phase of the East Bayfront, incorporating the public 
space overlooking Jarvis Street Slip (right) and the proposed new park (Sherbourne Park 
South). The triangular shape of the proposed new park is carried over from the initial precinct 
plan. However, this design element, which was a central part of the precinct plan, is largely 
lost on the edge of Jarvis Street Slip. This was due to the development of Block 4 for a media 
company headquarters. The design process for this particular building is described more in 
Section 8. 
 
The complicated process of translating the precinct planning and design principles 
and financial targets into zoning by-law amendments requires an active partnership 
between the corporation and city planners. The City of Toronto has therefore 
established a dedicated Waterfront Secretariat to oversee its participation in the 
waterfront redevelopment programme. The planning department also plays an active 
role in the TWRC’s precinct planning process by attending regular meetings with the 
corporation’s planning and design team and its consultants and has been very 
supportive of its public engagement efforts (described in Section 9). The waterfront 
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corporation also works with the City of Toronto to co-produce Municipal Class 
Environmental Assessments for all of the various precincts, which are required under 
the Ontario Environmental Assessment Act (1990) for major development proposals 
that include alterations to the existing public infrastructure, including roads, sewers 
and water courses (e.g. TWRC 2006). 
 
Figure 26: Urban Design Guidelines for the East Bayfront 
(Image from: TWRC 2007, 51 (Images 1-3) 66 (Image 4, overleaf)) 
 
 
An extract from the East Bayfront West-Precinct Design Guidelines demonstrating how the 
requirements of the amended zoning by-law for the East Bayfront might perform. Although 
this diagram is shown for illustrative purposes only, it should be noted that the guidelines are 
no longer in draft format as denoted on the above illustration. At the time this project was 
completed the document had not been updated on the TWRC/Waterfront Toronto website.  
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7.4 Implementing a precinct plan: the case for the East Bayfront 
 
The East Bayfront precinct provides an instructive lens to assess the implementation, 
albeit partial, of one of the precinct plans. So far, the waterfront corporation has 
overseen the completion of the major parks and open spaces in the East Bayfront, 
and the beginning of real estate development. The corporation assigned resources to 
the design and construction of open space on the waterfront via an initiative it has 
called ‘leading with landscape’, the objective of which has been to demonstrate a 
concrete commitment to the wider redevelopment programme and thereby 
encourage private sector investment (Waterfront Toronto 2007b). In pursuit of this 
initiative, the TWRC has used design competitions to attract international interest to 
the waterfront. 
 
Sugar Beach, a new public space located adjacent to the Jarvis Slip (see Figure 27), 
opened in 2010 following a design competition won by Montreal-based landscape 
architect Claude Cormier. The waterfront promenade in the East Bayfront was also 
the result of a design competition convened in 2007 for the entire spine of the Central 
Waterfront promenade and Queens Quay; it was won by a team led by Dutch 
landscape architecture firm West 8 (see: author 2014) and construction was 
completed in 2010. The large central public space, Sherbourne Common, was 
designed by the Vancouver-based landscape architects Philips Farevaag 
Smallenberg and was also completed in 2010 (see Figure 27). Unlike the other public 
spaces in the precinct, however, Sherbourne Common was not the subject of a 
competition because the design team was selected during the precinct planning 
process (TWRC 2005b). 
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Figure 27: Canada’s Sugar Beach and Sherbourne Common, East Bayfront 
(Photograph by Daniel Pearce, 2011) 
 
Identifiable because of its collection of bright pink umbrellas, Sugar Beach has been generally 
well received. Although the public space has garnered some criticism for its ‘kitschy’ design 
elements, such as the large rocks that aim to recreate the Canadian shield landscape of 
Northern Ontario, it has also been praised for its simplicity and the tactile sense of colour and 
texture. This image, taken in 2012, shows the park being well used despite the lack of any 
residential development in the precinct at the time. 
 
This image shows the central portion of Sherbourne Common in 2011 with the George Brown 
College building under construction in the background. In the foreground is a water feature 
that re-establishes the line of an ancient stream and meanders through a larger green space 
behind the central pavilion. The pavilion acts as a transitional element between the water 
fountain-play zone and the green space behind, and also houses facilities for the play space, 
which, in winter, becomes a neighbourhood ice rink. 
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A phasing strategy has been used to guide the implementation of the East Bayfront 
Precinct Plan since 2006 (see Figure 28) and, subject to local market conditions, the 
corporation (by now called Waterfront Toronto) anticipates that Phases 1 and 2 will 
be completed during the early 2020s (TWRC 6 2011). The two initial Phase 1 
projects – a large-floor plan office building for Corus Entertainment (Phase 1A) and a 
higher education building for George Brown College (the portion of Phase 1 adjacent 
to the water’s edge promenade) – were undertaken by public sector agencies 
between 2010 and 2012. Both represented an immediate departed from the precinct 
plan and, for reasons more fully explored in Section 8, the commercial office building, 
funded and constructed by TEDCO, proved particularly controversial because the 
design ignored one of the core urban design components of the master plan: the 
proposed diagonal building line adjacent to the Jarvis Slip that sought to open up 
views to the lake and emphasise the termination of the north-south streets on the 
waterfront (see Image 2 in Figure 24). 
 
Figure 28: East Bayfront Phasing Strategy. 
(TWRC 2006a, 28) 
 
 
The decision to locate a higher education campus in the precinct was announced in 
July 2008 and, despite not being a residential block (as proposed in the precinct 
plan), the corporation was confident that it would be a formidable ‘anchor’ on the 
waterfront (Waterfront Toronto 2008a). Although deviating from the precinct plan, the 
building responds positively to a number of the plan’s general principles. The building 
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steps down to the water’s edge from eight to five storeys and respects the 
requirement set out in the precinct plan that all ground floor areas should be 
animated with commercial uses. In contrast, the creation of an active ground floor 
was resolved less successfully on the adjacent Corus Building. TEDCO and their 
tenant, Corus Entertainment, wished to reserve the majority of the ground floor for 
those who worked in the building. Although some effort was made to activate the 
edge between the building and the waterfront – the design team incorporated sliding 
glass doors on the western elevation to facilitate open-air media events and leased 
space for a waterfront coffee shop in 2011 – the building remains relatively private. 
 
Figure 29: The Corus Building and George Brown College  
(Artist’s impression: TWRC 2005a, p. 26; photographs by the author, 2013) 
 
This image is extracted from the East Bayfront Precinct Plan. Looking east, it imagines the 
feel and scale of the tiered waterfront promenade at the approximate location of the Corus 
Building and George Brown College.   
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This photograph shows the waterfront promenade as constructed outside the Corus Building 
(looking west). The scale of the space is broadly similar to that imagined in the precinct plan 
and high quality street furniture, paving and landscape elements have been used. However, 
the bulk and singular architectural form of the Corus Building does detract from the quality of 
the space and the proposal to create a tiered promenade with three distinct movement 
corridors has been lost – a decision that means the promenade is arguably wider than 
necessary. 
 
This image shows the front and east elevation of George Brown College. With multiple 
elements, the building appears less bulky than its neighbour (the edge of the Corus Building 
can be seen in the background). The use of clear glass panels and public interior spaces 
overlooking the park and the waterfront serve to enliven the relationship with the public realm. 
But, together George Brown College and the Corus Building do mark a significant departure 
from the more delicate massing of the new buildings imagined in the precinct plan. 
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In 2008, Waterfront Toronto released the first RFQs for residential and mixed-use 
development at East Bayfront: one for the eastern portion of Phase 1B and another 
for the entire Phase 2 site (Waterfront Toronto 2008; 2008b). The American 
developer Hines was selected for Phase 2 (since name Bayside) and the local 
developer Great Gulf Homes was selected for Phase 1B (since named Parkside) 
(Waterfront Toronto 2012). Bayside and Parkside are currently under construction. 
Before the developers sought planning approval, confidential development 
agreements were signed with the TWRC, formalising commitments to the agreed 
planning and design vision outlined during the RFQ/RFP process. The rationale for 
this approach is explained by a senior TWRC executive (see, also, Figure 22 in 
Section 6): 
 
We have a development agreement with every developer 
and it says what they can and can’t do and one of the 
things they can’t do is ‘blow up’, without our permission, 
some of the principles that are in place. It also requires 
them…to go through our design review panel process, it 
requires them to build to LEED Gold…There’s a legal 
relationship created between Waterfront Toronto, the City of 
Toronto as landowner and the developer and so there are 
financial securities. It is like any transaction and that’s how 
you protect for the vision in the long run. Hopefully we 
picked the right partners (TWRC 6 2011). 
 
7.5 Precinct planning: an initial assessment 
 
Without question the construction of two non-residential buildings on the water’s 
edge during Phase 1 certainly altered the urban design character imagined in the 
precinct plan and the subsequent relationships that have been created between the 
new public spaces and buildings constructed in the precinct. It is, however, 
premature to judge the overall success of the East Bayfront precinct. Such an 
assessment must wait until the large residential components of the plan are built over 
the next decade. Nevertheless, it is possible to examine why the form and 
arrangement of the development projects completed so far have diverted from the 
precinct plan vision and principles and, in so doing, offer some initial thoughts on the 
role of the waterfront precinct plans as coordinating urban design plans. 
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The East Bayfront precinct plan were intended to facilitate a seamless translation 
from ‘plan’ to ‘zoning’ and establish a clear set of rules for development. Yet, the 
reality has been quite different. While the zoning by-law amendment and 
accompanying urban design guidelines faithfully reproduced the vision and principles 
that emerged from the precinct planning process, many of the core ideas have been 
subtly reshaped and, in some instances, substantially changed. The precinct plan 
thus did what many urban design theorists think a masterplan should do: it provided 
a sense of security for the waterfront corporation while, at the same time, allowing 
market flexibility and new creative ideas to evolve around the basic tenets of the plan. 
The plan was never replaced by a wholly new concept and the early completion of 
the public spaces, allowed for the implementation of some of the most important 
design principles.  
 
One of the urban designers involved in writing the original plans notes that is 
translated into “…a very simple by-law….everything that needed to be said…., 
leaving the rest to the skills of the building architect” (TWRC 5 2011). Nevertheless, 
the same urban designer also laments that this approach was undermined when the 
architectural team selected by TEDCO to deliver the Corus Building chose to all but 
ignore the vision and principles of the plan. He states that the corporation should 
have said: “Here’s the plot, here’s the rules” (TWRC 5 2011), but by choosing not to 
do so the plan was compromised. The experience of the Corus Building showed the 
corporation that master plans are fragile instruments, regardless of the additional 
safeguards that are put in place to protect them. Masterplanning is temporal and 
predicting the future is hard. The evidence from this case demonstrates that, 
however well a master planning process is conceived, politics, market forces and 
previously unknown opportunities or threats will cause priorities to shift and 
conditions to change. 
 
Design and development also continues on the other waterfront precincts, especially 
those located in the eastern waterfront. The design competition and implementation 
process associated with the public realm upgrades to the Central Waterfront, 
including the waterfront promenade, are described by this author in (author 2014) 
and the story of the West Don Lands precinct planning process can be found in 
Bunce (2011). Construction of the West Don Lands precinct is underway, with part of 
the site being used as the Athlete’s Village for the 2015 PanAm Games and planning 
and participation efforts for the precincts located in the Port Lands are continuing. 
Although not carrying any statutory weight, the precinct plans have emerged as 
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relatively powerful planning and design instruments. The City of Toronto, in 
conjunction with the waterfront corporation, has generated a successful model of 
“integrating zoning into planning and addressing the limitations of zoning” (Punter 
2007, 171) by translating the design and planning principles contained in the precinct 
plans into a legally binding zoning by-law amendment upon completion. 
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8. Discretionary design review 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This section turns to the Waterfront Design Review Panel and looks in detail at the 
role of peer-led assessment on Toronto’s waterfront used to generate better 
outcomes (Lai 1988; Punter 2003a; Dawson and Higgins 2009) and design review 
panels are usually composed of professional experts or local officials. In many 
instances, review panels have proven to be an effective method for meeting the 
agreed objectives for an area, such as those contained in a masterplan or guidelines, 
or for raising the general standard of design quality (Kumar and George 2002; Punter 
2003a). But, as Punter (2003a) summarises in his study of the Urban Design Panel 
in Vancouver, Canada, the peer review method has also been criticised for failing to 
adhere to guiding principles and for allowing arbitrary debates. Moreover, architects 
and other design professionals often complain that peer-led design review can inhibit 
their creative freedom (Costonis 1989; Mandelker 1993; Scheer 1994). 
 
8.2 The Waterfront Design Review Panel 
 
Over the past thirty years design review panels have become an increasingly popular 
tool for monitoring urban and building design (Punter 2003a). However, when the 
waterfront corporation proposed a Waterfront Design Review Panel in 2005 it was an 
entirely new concept for Toronto. At the time there were only three design review 
panels operating in Canada: one in the City of Niagara Falls, another in Ottawa, 
under the purview of the National Capital Commission and a third in Vancouver. The 
Vancouver panel is perhaps the most renowned review operation in Canada and is 
credited for “refining design quality, setting high standards, and creating a culture of 
‘peer review’” (Punter 2003a, 133) within that city’s planning system. The City of 
Toronto does now operate a review panel. It was temporarily established in 2006 to 
review a limited number of high priority projects and became a permanent advisory 
body in 2009 (City of Toronto 2012). Many of the procedures put in place by the 
Waterfront Design Review Panel were subsequently adopted by the City of Toronto. 
 
The waterfront corporation announced that its new Waterfront Design Review Panel 
would be charged with upholding the corporation’s commitment to design excellence 
by providing professional and objective advice on all waterfront projects under its 
purview. Its remit would include not only buildings, but also site plans, parks, streets 
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and public art. The corporation appointed a Toronto-based architect called Bruce 
Kuwabara as the inaugural panel chair and, following the model used by the 
Vancouver Urban Design Panel, sought a diverse group of general members, who 
could bring a balance of architectural expertise and supporting professional skills. To 
ensure that the planning authority is witness to the proceedings of the panel, the 
terms of reference state that the City of Toronto’s director of urban design should be 
present at panel meetings, but as a non-voting and silent member; the panel’s 
proceedings are also observed by the TWRC’s vice-president of planning and design, 
who acts as the corporation’s official representative.The unpaid members of the 
panel are appointed for three years and the corporation sought to put together a 
team of professional experts that not only demonstrated individual creativity and had 
an international reputation, but could also work well in a group setting and respect 
the ethos of the TWRC’s planning and design mandate (TWRC 3 2011). The terms 
of reference for the panel also stated that all meetings would be open to the public 
(TWRC 2005c).  
 
8.3 Power to influence design outcomes 
 
Legally, the waterfront panel is only an advisory board. But, as explained in Section 
6.3, the City of Toronto expects that any applicant applying for development 
permission on the waterfront to attend the panel and includes this stipulation in the 
zoning by-law amendments for the waterfront precincts (City of Toronto 2006a). On 
the other hand, the by-law amendments do not require developers to adhere to the 
panel’s advice. As a result, The Waterfront Design Review Panel is officially 
independent of the City of Toronto’s official site plan approval and development 
application process. Subsequently, all of the panel’s recommendations are made 
directly to the corporation and, to quote the panel terms of reference, “in no way 
replace the City of Toronto’s regulatory approvals process” (TWRC 2005c, 1). 
Considering these limited parameters, the TWRC’s vice president of planning and 
design notes that the panel tends to “influence decisions more through moral suasion 
than legal authority” (TWRC 2005d, 4). However, the corporation has also taken 
steps to reaffirm the review requirements set out in the zoning by-law amendments. 
All of the corporation’s land development partners must enter into a legal agreement 
that, in addition to other conditions, obligates them to attend a staggered review by 
the Waterfront Design Review Panel before they submit an application to the City of 
Toronto for site plan approval. This means the panel operates like a ‘fail-safe 
mechanism’. Consequently, the panel’s power goes much further than its advisory 
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mandate suggests. 
 
8.4. A shaky start for design review: the Corus Building 
 
While the panel has been broadly successful as a ‘fail safe’ mechanism it’s credibility 
was severely tested in 2007 when it reviewed a proposal for a new waterfront media 
centre. Section 6 described a crucial 2006 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
signed by TEDCO, the City of Toronto’s economic development agency, and the 
TWRC that saw much of the land controlled by TEDCO in the East Bayfront and the 
Port Lands transferred to the new corporation (City of Toronto 2006). However, as 
Section 6 also explained, TEDCO negotiated to retain a small parcel of land in the 
East Bayfront precinct (Parcel 1A shown in Figure 28) where it planned to construct a 
media complex. As described in Section 7, this would ultimately become the 
headquarters of Corus Entertainment. The journey of the Corus Building (initially 
called Project Symphony) through the waterfront design review process highlights 
the fragility of the TWRC’s design excellence mandate and led to a number of 
important changes to the corporation’s review process. The story of the review 
process also identifies some of the challenges associated with peer review and the 
critical role that clear and broadly understood administrative procedures can play in 
guarantying more effective design governance. 
 
Before the review process for the media complex began in 2007 a number of 
potential problems had been flagged. First, it was evident that the complexity of the 
new building would demand significant alterations to the height, setback and massing 
of the land parcel. Second, despite the departure from the precinct plan, the project 
had received the backing of the city’s mayor, David Miller, who was swayed by the 
potential for creative jobs on the waterfront. Third, although the TWRC had agreed to 
make a $12.5 million contribution to the project in exchange for compliance with the 
Waterfront Design Review Panel’s recommendations (TWRC 3 2011), the media 
complex was ultimately located on land that was not controlled by the TWRC and 
thus the corporation’s power to shape the design process remained weak. 
 
The proposal came before the review panel on five occasions between February and 
November 2007 and again for two follow up sessions during 2008, following a 
change of design team. From the time of the initial review onwards the review 
process was characterised by hostility, heated exchanges and increasing 
politicisation. In the initial review, held in February, the panel members were 
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immediately troubled by the building’s relationship to the East Bayfront precinct plan 
and the integration of the ground floor to the surrounding public realm (TWRC 2007a). 
In the second review a few weeks later, the design team, led by Diamond Schmidt 
Architects, presented a revised proposal that reduced the bulk of the building and 
created a stronger relationship with the public realm through the introduction of 
ground floor retail and more generous public open space. The panel, however, 
remained unconvinced: concerns were raised about the ‘fortress-like’ massing of the 
building and the lack of animation achieved on the building edges that did not directly 
face the lake. The panel also continued to highlight the detrimental impact that they 
felt the proposed building would have upon the precinct plan. Objecting to the panel’s 
advice, and noting the changes he had made, the lead architect argued that he was 
receiving confusing advice from the TWRC and stated that the review panel did not 
appear to trust him to deliver a high quality building (TWRC 2007b).  
 
As the review panel meetings were open to the public, the outcome of the second 
meeting made its way to the press where the panel chair voiced his concerns about 
the evolving design of the building (Hume 2007). The city’s mayor, David Miller, 
chose to respond, noting that then panel should be more careful about how it raised 
issues in public (Hume 2007a). Thus, by the time of the third review, held in April 
2007, tensions were high. The lead architect presented the latest iteration of the 
proposal and noted that he had sought to address the panel’s concerns with respect 
to the bulk of the building. For example, the building had been reconfigured in an 
asymmetrical arrangement to break up the massing of the waterfront elevation. Many 
of the changes were well received. However, concerns remained about the 
accessibility of the building and the architectural treatment. This second point, in 
particular, lead to a bitter disagreement between one panel member and the 
presenting architect about the design language of the media complex (TWRC 2007c). 
Despite the heated review process, the panel did offer in-principle support for the 
proposal, but emphasised that the design team needed to “push a bit further to 
create a building which reflects its context on the waterfront” (ibid., 5).  
 
The design team returned to the review panel on two further occasions, in June and 
November 2007. At the November meeting, the panel were concerned that the 
quality of the design, rather than improve, had been compromised since the last 
panel meeting (Waterfront Toronto 2007c), The panel reemphasised their concerns 
about the building’s relationship to the surrounding public realm and further argued 
that many of the building’s best features had been ‘value engineered out’.(ibid.). As a 
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direct consequence of the review, the chair of the review panel sent a memorandum 
to the corporation’s board of directors and stated that it could no longer support it’s 
decision to grant conditional approval of the project. The board of directors agreed to 
withhold a portion of the corporation’s funding for the project until the design team 
had satisfied the panel (Waterfront Toronto 2007d, 2). With pressure mounting, 
including from the mayor’s office, the review panel eventually granted conditional 
approval for the media complex in January 2008 (Waterfront Toronto 2008c). The 
architectural treatment of the building remained little changed, although the panel did 
accept that some improvements had been made. It was evident that the panel was 
never going to be satisfied with the overall design strategy, nor the design team with 
the panel’s advice. 
 
Figure 30: The Corus Building 
(Photograph 1 courtesy of Waterfront Toronto; remaining photographs by the author, 
2011) 
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These three images show the completed Corus Building and demonstrate how it responds to 
the public realm. The waterfront elevation is shown in the top image, which, at the request of 
the panel, was split into two wings on either side of a central atrium to reduce the bulk of the 
building. The second image is taken looking east at the building across the new Sugar Beach 
public space. The review panel was not successful in requiring the design team to observe 
the diagonal building line proposed for the west elevation of the building in the precinct plan. 
The third image shows the loading bays for the building and vividly confirms the fear 
expressed by the panel that their placement would detract from the streetscape of the East 
Bayfront. 
 
 
 
8.5. Achieving greater clarity 
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The design review process for the Corus Building ended with mixed results. The 
panel was able to encourage some minor changes to the design (TORONTO 6 2011), 
but was never able to get on board with the architectural philosophy or fully reconcile 
its opposition to the changes being forced upon the precinct plan. In the end, the 
panel’s capacity to engineer a change of direction was limited by the corporation’s 
lack of legal authority over the land parcel and the politicisation of the review process. 
Not only did the corporation’s board of directors ultimately have to get involved, but 
during the middle of 2007, in the midst of the review process, the mayor and City 
Council approved a loan to help TEDCO complete the project and offered Corus 
Entertainment a significant twenty-year tax relief benefit if they moved to the 
waterfront site (City of Toronto 2007). In addition to these external factors, it was also 
evident that the panel failed to operate effectively under pressure. One panel 
member remembers that the process was “kind of [like] theatre” (DESIGN 7 2011), 
while another reflects that many panel members made the mistake of turning the 
review into a pure architectural critique (DESIGN 1 2011). One of the presenting 
architects adds that the panel acted like the ‘aesthetic police’ and often gave 
contradictory advice or endeavoured to redesign the building during the panel 
meetings (DESIGN 6 2011). 
 
Recognising that the Waterfront Design Review Panel could be much more effective, 
the corporation’s senior design team worked with the panel to develop a new set of 
procedural guidelines. These were adopted in the form of a new by-law at the 
beginning of the panel’s January 2008 meeting (Waterfront Toronto 2008c) and 
offered precise details on how the panel should deliberate. The by-law included a 
clear statement on how many times a project could be reviewed by the panel: 
something that the previous terms of reference had failed to do. To improve clarity 
and avoid some of the inconsistencies experienced during the media complex review, 
the new by-law incorporated a phased review structure requiring all projects to 
receive a minimum of four reviews. The four phases were staggered and 
purposefully included an early conceptual review to allow the panel an opportunity to 
“focus on the quality and appropriateness of the main design intent, or ‘the big idea’ 
of the project” (Waterfront Toronto 2008d, 6), before the production of more detailed 
designs (see Figure 31). 
 
 
Figure 31: Phased Review Process for the Waterfront Design Review Panel 
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(Diagram by the author; adapted from Waterfront Toronto 2008d, 8) 
 
 
The most important and, indeed, controversial component of the phased review 
process was the introduction of voting. When it was set up, the panel had decided 
not to vote at the end of each review, but following the confusion surrounding the 
media complex review, the corporation insisted that the panel reconsider. The 
waterfront corporation argued that voting on whether to support a project or not was 
essential if the panel wished to avoid the accusation of proffering contradictory 
advice. Voting has since helped the panel to make clearer decisions and improved 
the clarity of the panel’s advice. A qualitative reading of the meeting minutes 
released before and after the introduction of the new by-law indicates that the quality 
of the panel’s discussions improved as a result of the various operational changes. 
The decision to consider a specific set of issues at each phase of the review process 
helped the panel to focus their discussions and avoid offering ‘design solutions’ 
during the course of their evaluations. Moreover, the knowledge that each review 
would conclude with a vote appeared to help the panel to be more consistent. The 
result was that the chair’s final summaries were much more direct and less 
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ambiguous than before. 
 
Demonstrating the need for what Punter (2007, 171) refers to as ‘clear a priori rules 
and guidelines for urban design intervention’, the review of the Corus Building laid 
bare many administrative failings and directly precipitated the more rigorous 
guidelines adopted in early 2008. Yet, more broadly, it also demonstrated the fragility 
of design review and the unpredictability of politics, personality and ego. Creative 
design has an intensely personal dimension, especially when designers have their 
projects publically scrutinised by their professional equals. Nevertheless, the 
Waterfront Design Review Panel has emerged as an important voice on waterfront 
design offering an added layer of sophistication to the planning decision-making 
process. To some extent this is due to the panel’s soft power, or ‘moral suasion’, 
which is bolstered by the calibre and reputation of both the chair and the other panel 
members. Its panel members are well respected and the panel proceedings generate 
sustained interest from the press, especially when high profile projects come before it. 
As the panel has become more established, designers who are called up for review 
often feel obligated to present their best work, not wanting to be embarrassed in front 
of their colleagues and competitors. This, a former panel member states, has 
transformed the review process into a genuine “peer review” (DESIGN 1 2011). 
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9. Public participation and engagement 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Earlier sections of this paper have noted that commitments to public participation and 
engagement during the waterfront visioning process were tokenistic. Public 
consultation during the Task Force years often occurred after strategic decisions had 
been made and, as a result, had a negligible impact on the waterfront planning and 
design agenda. As the corporation took control of the waterfront redevelopment 
process, concerns remained about its ability to act in the public interest (Eidelman 
2011; Laidley 2011). In this section, the paper looks at the TWRC’s commitment to 
public participation. Eidelman (2011) notes that the corporation’s public participation 
philosophy and practice is now “a far cry from the closed-door elite only approaches” 
(280) that were the hallmark of the Task Force era, while a former City of Toronto 
planning manager claims that the corporation is widely considered to be a “master at 
public consultation” (TORONTO 8 2011), and far exceeds its legislative mandate to 
engage local people in the waterfront revitalisation programme. “Right from the initial 
phases, before anything is done,” he states, “…there are pens put to paper right 
through the whole process. They are very, very good at that and people really 
appreciate it. All the residents and the business community feel very positive about it” 
(TORONTO 8 2011).  
 
9.2 Why a change in practice? 
 
There appear to be a number of reasons why the corporation transformed its practice. 
One political operative at the City of Toronto argues that the TWRC has simply been 
able to reserve a much larger proportion of its budget for public consultation than the 
City of Toronto ever could during the secondary plan process (POLITICAL 2 2011). It 
has also been argued that the corporation has consciously used public meetings and 
other participatory processes to build a broad constituency of support for its 
waterfront planning and design vision, in part, for reasons of political expediency. 
“[W]ithout backing from the local community, and the political will that comes with 
such support,” contends Eidelman (2001), “the TWRC may not be able to convince 
government partners to extend its funding” (280) in the future. It is not easy to 
pinpoint whether the availability of resources or a more calculated political objective 
was the primary driver of the waterfront corporation’s improved commitment to public 
consultation. Both certainly influenced the changes that occurred; however, there 
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does also appear to have been a genuine desire on the part of the leadership team 
to improve their practice and engage more directly with people who lived and worked 
on the waterfront. 
 
The origins of the transformation can be traced to a key relationship that developed 
in the early 2000s between Robert Fung and the West Don Lands Committee, which 
was formed in 1997 as an agglomeration of local neighbourhood associations and 
stakeholder groups to protest against the construction of a horseracing track on the 
long-derelict West Don Lands site (West Don Lands Committee 1999). In 1999, the 
committee successfully applied for a federal grant to conduct a community-led 
planning workshop with the aim of demonstrating that a more thoughtful development 
strategy might satisfy the needs of all stakeholders, including the provincial 
government (ibid.). The workshop also coincided – like the Task Force’s parallel 
visioning process for the wider waterfront – with the emerging bid process for the 
2008 Olympic Games, which, as noted in Section 3, had proposed that a media 
village be located on a portion of the West Don Lands site (see Figure 13). 
 
The West Don Lands Committee held their three-day planning workshop in 
November 1999. Among the principles and strategies for future development agreed 
by the planning workshop participants was a desire to weave the West Don Lands 
site into existing communities and create a 24-hr mixed use and a pedestrian-scaled 
community with significant amounts of public open space (West Don Lands 
Committee 1999). Three ten-person multi-disciplinary design teams attempted to 
transform the community’s ideas into sample development concepts. All of the teams 
produced variations on a dense mixed-use residential neighbourhood with ample 
public space provision. The West Don Lands Committee published an illustrated 
summary booklet of its efforts that was later presented to the City of Toronto’s 
Planning and Transportation Committee, where it was endorsed as a model for 
similar future planning exercises in the city (City of Toronto 2000b). 
 
Among the attendees at the three-day workshop was Robert Fung, who had been 
appointed chair of the Toronto Waterfront Redevelopment Task Force only a few 
weeks before (Rusk 1999). As discussed in Section 3, Fung’s appointment had 
initially come as quite a surprise because he lacked planning and design experience 
and, as a result, many West Don Lands Committee members were sceptical of his 
appointment. However, they were also encouraged by his decision to attend and 
actively participate in their workshop (CIVIL 5 2011). For Fung, the experience of 
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taking part in the workshop became an important milestone during his leadership of 
the waterfront redevelopment project. Meeting local people and learning about their 
aspirations for the waterfront altered his ideas about how to lead the revitalisation 
programme (TWRC 8 2011). Aware of the powerful role that the evolving corporation 
might one day have on the waterfront, the leaders of the West Don Lands Committee 
also realised that they had to demonstrate their credibility as potential partners in the 
revitalisation process early on. One member of the West Don Lands Committee 
admits that the timing of the three-day planning workshop a few weeks after Fung 
was appointed “couldn’t have been better” (CIVIL 5 2011), noting: 
 
…we [the West Don Lands Committee] demonstrated that, 
as members of the public who had informed themselves 
and committed themselves to this work, we had something 
to add. We were valuable allies and valuable sources of 
information about our communities, and it was important for 
them [the corporation] to actually develop a relationship 
with us”  (CIVIL 5 2011). 
 
9.3 Developing a Public Consultation and Participation Strategy 
 
The first evidence of a shift towards more positive consultation about the waterfront’s 
future can be traced to the new corporation’s 2002 inaugural business plan, which 
included a participation strategy that stated the corporation’s desire to use public 
consultation to “[b]uild constituency, trust and support for the Corporation” (TWRC 
2002a, 4) and generate a positive dialogue between those who might disagree about 
the future of the waterfront. The corporation aimed to create a productive 
environment for participation that straddled the divide between experts and lay 
people, while also generating a forum for resolving conflicts and encouraging 
community leaders to emerge. What was envisaged, and what has since evolved as 
one of the corporation’s central philosophies, was an iterative relationship between 
open forum public meetings and a stakeholder roundtable. 
 
The West Don Lands Committee and other community organisations, including the 
neighbourhood associations representing other areas of the waterfront, were 
amenable to the general concept proposed in the TWRC’s business plan, but 
questioned how public forums and a stakeholder roundtable group would work in 
practice. In their view, the strategy document failed to adequately explain which 
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organisations were waterfront ‘stakeholders’ and what planning and development 
projects would be subject to the type of consultation proposed. In a formal written 
response to the proposal, the West Don Lands Committee – by far the most 
organised of local neighbourhood associations at the time – noted that a successful 
participation process had to find ways to avoid ‘tokenistic’ public meetings and, in an 
effort to more clearly define the role of the stakeholder roundtable group, suggested 
that stakeholder advisory committees could be convened for each of the waterfront 
precincts (Wilkey 2003). The Committee further proposed that each stakeholder 
advisory committee might “…include representatives with demonstrated expertise, 
commitment, and where possible, accountability to an existing community 
stakeholder” (ibid., 1) and be convened at the earliest stages of the planning and 
design process to allow the community’s local knowledge to be integrated into the 
decision making process. 
 
9.4 Implementing ‘iterative’ public participation  
 
The Committee’s response to the proposed strategy had a direct impact on the 
approach to public participation that was adopted by the waterfront corporation. The 
corporation has combined public meetings with stakeholder advisory committees 
(SACs) – that are unique to each precinct – on all of it projects. In addition, it has 
also made a concerted effort to consult the public about individual buildings and 
public spaces, as well as (on-going) phases of construction. Furthermore, and in an 
effort to increase accessibility, the corporation’s public meetings are held on 
weekday evenings. Central to this approach is the iterative nature of the format used 
(see Figure 32). The first public meeting during a precinct planning process typically 
begins with a broader discussion of the participants’ ideas, desires and concerns 
about the site in question. Design principles and master planning options are not 
presented until later meetings, by which time the design teams have had an 
opportunity to respond to the local knowledge of the participants.  
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Figure 32: Waterfront consultation and participation process 
(Diagram by the author) 
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Further feedback is collected at the interim SAC meetings, which are held in camera 
with community representatives, as well as local businesses and institutions located 
in or in close proximity to the precinct. These include active neighbourhood 
associations such as the Gooderham and Worts Neighbourhood Association (which 
represents the residents of a new mixed-use development just north of the East 
Bayfront precinct), the Central Waterfront Neighbourhood Association, the York Quay 
Neighbourhood Association and the Waterfront Business Improvement Association. 
Large commercial concerns located on the waterfront, such as the Redpath sugar 
company and Loblaws supermarkets, are also directly involved in the SAC process. 
The primary aim of the SAC meetings is to have focused and detailed discussions 
about specific design and planning proposals in preparation for the next public 
meeting. Although no minutes are released from the SACs, a thorough summary 
booklet of each public meeting is produced and hard copies are made available and 
the summary documents for most of the public meetings conducted by the TWRC 
Toronto since 2003 are readily available on the corporation’s website. 
 
Written summaries of the precinct planning meetings demonstrate the strength of the 
iterative engagement processes adopted by the TWRC and, in particular, the level of 
collaboration that occurs between design experts and lay people. In contrast to 
previous research on design collaboration events, which has found expert opinion to 
dominate and obfuscate the decision-making process (Grant 2006; Bond and 
Thompson-Fawcett 2007), the format adopted by the TWRC appears to emphasise 
reciprocity. At the start of each meeting, the corporation’s design consultants outline 
how the evolving design has changed since the last public meeting and then, as a 
starting point for the next round of discussion, seek feedback on the new material 
they have produced. The same process is repeated at each meeting until a final 
precinct plan is produced. Further SAC and annual public meetings are then held to 
solicit feedback on the scope of supporting planning documentation, such as zoning 
by-law amendments, and the various building projects that are underway. For the 
corporation, the SACs act as a critical sounding board for new and, at times, 
controversial ideas and provide an important two-way link between the community 
and the corporation (Waterfront Toronto 2012a).  
 
The general public do appear to show up, in large numbers, to the forums convened 
by the waterfront corporation. The summary report from the West Don Lands public 
consultation documents that between 100 and 200 people attended each of the four 
public forums (TWRC 2004), while the East Bayfront precinct planning processes 
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was attended by between 200 and 250 people. In 2008, the public forums that were 
convened to discuss the master planning proposals for Queens Quay Boulevard on 
the Central Waterfront were equally well attended and attracted between 230 and 
200 local residents (Waterfront Toronto 2008e; 2008f). Moreover, a three-day series 
of public forums on the revitalisation of the Port Lands precinct, held in March 2012, 
was attended by over 500 people (Lura Consulting and SWERHUN 2012). 
 
9.5 Widening opportunities for participation? 
 
The public participation process on Toronto’s waterfront has not been without 
criticism. Lehrer and Laidley (2008) identify the wider case as a new form of ‘mega-
project’ that uses the neoliberal language of interurban competition to focus on 
benefits for particular groups in society, rather than benefits for all. The authors 
support this assertion with the example of the corporation’s public forums and 
stakeholder meetings, arguing that while the meetings are well attended by members 
of the public, they fail, in the authors’ estimation, to engage a diversity of local 
residents, especially those living in poorer districts of Toronto. This criticism is shared 
by Eidelman who also argues that residents from nearby low-income 
neighbourhoods have been generally “underrepresented” (2011, 280). It might be 
further argued that one of the biggest gaps in the corporation’s strategy has been the 
lack of engagement with people who have recently moved to the waterfront. The 
membership of many of the waterfront SACs has not changed significantly since the 
start of the precinct planning processes for the East Bayfront and the West Don 
Lands. Therefore, while the relationship building that has occurred should be 
applauded, the narrowly defined composition of the SACs remains problematic. 
Almost all of the community representation on the SACs is drawn from adjacent 
neighbourhoods and the representatives tend to be retired white professionals. In 
this respect, the corporation must also recognise that the design and planning 
priorities of people living on the waterfront, as opposed to those living near it, might 
well be shaped by different considerations, especially if they have invested in 
waterfront real estate. 
 
A further concern relates to the structure of the SACs. While the iterative feedback 
loop that exists between open public meetings and smaller invitation-only 
stakeholder meetings is an effective model for gathering a combination of general 
and focused feedback, the transparency of the SAC process is troubling. As stated 
earlier, no minutes are taken at these in-camera meetings and, therefore, little can be 
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known about the nature of the discussions that take place. The corporation claims 
that sensitive financial data relating to land deals and real estate markets is often 
discussed and, therefore, it would place the corporation at a competitive 
disadvantage if minutes were published. Yet the lack of an official record severely 
limits the openness of the SAC process and, unnecessarily obfuscates an otherwise 
formidable instrument in the public consultation and participation process employed 
on Toronto’s waterfront. 
 
Despite these challenges, the waterfront corporation has, in large part, transformed 
its approach to consultation and does engage many hundreds of local people and 
stakeholders in the planning and design of the waterfront each year. In contrast to 
the lacklustre public dialogue achieved by the earlier Task Force, the corporation 
now meets many of the basic conditions for collaborative decision-making (Bond and 
Thompson-Fawcett 2007). By establishing an iterative dialogue with local people and 
stakeholders the corporation has, to a large extent, provided “the conditions for all 
members of the community to be involved in the process of developing and 
committing to a coordinated vision of urban design” (Punter 2007, 171). Moreover, it 
has managed to establish a collaborative process for the periodic review of urban 
design plans (author 2015) by continuing to consult local community groups and 
stakeholders on the master plans and building projects as they change and evolve. It 
has also created a forum for expert and experiential ideas to come together and for 
bridges to be built between various opinions on the future of the waterfront’s 
revitalization: a process that might be cast as ‘mutual learning’ (Friedmann 1973).  
 
Yet, the relationship that has formed between the local community associations and 
the waterfront corporation remains dynamic and delicate. When the precinct planning 
process for the West Don Lands and the East Bayfront were conducted in the mid-
2000s there were very few residents or business that were located in the two 
precincts. But, as implementation has got started and the first residential buildings 
are occupied this situation will change. No longer will all the people attending public 
forums and SACs be mere observers, instead they will be members of the 
community, living and working on waterfront with a vested interest in its future. 
Making sure these actors have a voice remains one of the corporation’s biggest 
challenges. 
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10. Conclusion 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
The post-industrial story of Toronto’s waterfront began in the 1960s. Throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, the waterfront was plagued by a lack of strategic 
vision, transparency and inter-governmental cooperation, and a public, accessible 
and well-designed waterfront – while always the aspiration of successive political 
leaders – failed to materialise. Cut off from the downtown by the Gardiner 
Expressway and the parallel railway corridor, the waterfront remained a largely 
forgotten part of the city and many of the sporadic development projects that 
emerged were poorly conceived. Since 1999, however, coordinated public 
expenditure and private investment has shifted the narrative on Toronto’s waterfront 
and, under the direction of a development corporation, the city has witnessed the 
start of a waterfront renaissance. The construction of new open spaces, a waterfront 
promenade and various residential and commercial buildings has been achieved via 
a complex array of financial arrangements, political agreements and planning policy, 
supported by a suite of new design tools and mechanisms. 
 
This final section of the paper presents a series of reflections on the urban design 
process that has shaped the city’s waterfront since 1999, evaluating the extent to 
which some of the design objectives for the waterfront have been met and assessing 
the tools and mechanisms employed by the waterfront corporation to further its goal 
of ‘design excellence’ (TWRC 2002). The section ends with some final thoughts on 
the future of the design-led planning agenda and the wider lessons that might be 
drawn from the case. 
 
10.2 Key design governance themes since 1999 
 
The biggest surprise from the recent history of Toronto’s waterfront is the speed with 
which a coordinated and design-led vision of the waterfront was put into motion in the 
early 2000s after so many decades of inaction. The key urban design governance 
themes that have shaped this process are summarised as follows: 
 
• The bid for the 2008 Olympic Games convinced the federal, provincial and 
municipal levels of governments to commit to an urban design vision for the 
waterfront (2000) and provide political and financial support to a dedicated 
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redevelopment corporation (2000-2001), albeit with limited financial and 
planning powers. 
• The early strategic definition of urban design used by politicians and the 
waterfront Task Force (2000-2002) was narrowly defined and wedding the 
future of the waterfront to notions of urban competitiveness, privileging the 
economic value of urban design and promoting sites for New Economy jobs. 
• The language found in the early visioning documents produced by the private 
sector Task Force (2000) was often identical to that used in official City of 
Toronto planning documents (1999) suggesting a close working relationship, 
but also a lack of openness and engagement with the public (Lehrer and 
Laidley 2008). 
• The waterfront secondary plan (2002) represented a positive shift in the 
planning philosophy for the waterfront by focusing on the quality of place and 
imagining a neighbourhood-scaled environment that would provide enhanced 
accessibility to the lake 
• Despite funding commitments made by the three governments, the financial 
stability of the new waterfront corporation (formally created in 2002) was 
weak and it nearly went bankrupt (2004). 
• A last minute funding commitment (2004) staved off bankruptcy but laid bare 
the financial vulnerability of the waterfront corporation, which continues to be 
reliant on short-term funding contributions and lacks the power to raise funds 
independently. 
• This deficit of financial power led the waterfront corporation to find new ways 
to assert its strategic role on the waterfront and two memoranda of 
understanding for the West Don Lands (2005) and the East Bayfront (2006) 
confirmed the corporation’s role as the ‘lead master planner’ of the waterfront 
lands and consolidated its control over large areas of the waterfront. 
• A new ‘layer’ of urban design tools and mechanisms, including the precinct 
plans, a design review panel (established in 2005) and urban design 
guidelines have emerged as the core components of the waterfront 
corporation’s approach to design governance. 
• The waterfront corporation relies on development agreements with its private 
sector partners to ensure compliance with its design excellence agenda. 
• The waterfront corporation’s approach to precinct planning precipitated a 
fundamental shift towards public consultation and engagement on all 
elements of the waterfront planning process (since 2002). 
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• Design competitions have been used to generate both public and commercial 
interest in the waterfront planning and design vision, and led to the creation of 
popular public spaces that have won numerous awards for the quality and 
creativity (since 2005). 
 
The waterfront corporation has achieved a great deal more in the past eleven years 
than previous efforts to plan and redevelop Toronto’s waterfront, but it has yet to 
achieve all of objectives that were set in the waterfront secondary plan, Making 
Waves, which established the need to: remove barriers/make connections, build a 
network of spectacular waterfront parks and open spaces, promote a clean and 
green environment and create dynamic and diverse new communities (see Figure 
19). The limited accessibility of the waterfront from the downtown core, in particular, 
greatly detracts from other successes in the individual waterfront precincts. Yet at 
this relatively early stage in the process, it is premature to offer a comprehensive 
design assessment of the overall implementation. The corporation has, however, 
been particularly successful with respect to parks and open space and its 
commitment to master planning, but as it transitions from being a primarily plan-
making organisation into one intently focused on implementation, the corporation 
faces an uphill battle to maintain continued political support and generate the 
necessary funds to implement the various components of its ambitious waterfront 
vision.  
 
The corporation’s funding model remains its greatest limitation. Although the three 
governments made a shared pledge of $1.5 billion towards the waterfront 
redevelopment effort in 1999, a large amount of public money has been directed 
towards projects favoured by politicians at the time rather than the corporation’s 
planning and design programme. Furthermore, as a public entity, the corporation is 
specifically barred from raising funds independently. Such an institutional design 
limitation means the corporation has to rely on transfers from any or all of the three 
levels of government. This greatly limits its ability to act efficiently in the waterfront 
real estate market because the relative commitment of the federal, provincial and 
municipal governments to the long-term waterfront redevelopment programme rest 
precariously on the outcome of three separate election cycles and thereby the 
actions of politicians who hold public office at the time. 
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Figure 33: Public Realm Improvements on the Central Waterfront 
(Photographs by Daniel Pearce, 2011) 
 
This photograph depicts the Rees Wave Deck in the Central Waterfront. The ‘wave deck’ is 
one of series of new sculptural wooden structures along the water’s edge that emerged from 
a design competition for the Central Waterfront as part of the corporation’s leading with 
landscape programme. 
 
10.3 An assessment of urban design governance on Toronto’s waterfront  
 
In the opening section of this paper, a series of questions were posed about the 
effectiveness of the regime used to govern urban design on Toronto’s waterfront. 
These were drawn from internationally derived best practice principles for design 
review and development management. The principles are grouped into four themes: 
community collaboration and visioning, the integration of planning and zoning and 
other instruments, broad and substantive ecological design principles and due 
process and skills. Employing a similar format to Punter, who used the original 
principles to evaluate the design control system in Vancouver (2003) and Sydney 
(2005), the paper now offers an assessment of the urban design process on 
Toronto’s waterfront using a adapted version of the principles developed by Punter 
(2007) and this author (author 2015). 
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Turning first to community collaboration and visioning, the scope and quality of 
community consultation conducted by the waterfront corporation is one of its most 
significant achievements. Beginning with the first public meetings for the West Don 
Lands and East Bayfront precinct plans in 2003, the corporation has conducted 
detailed consultation on all of its masterplans, building projects and public space. By 
interweaving public meetings with smaller stakeholder advisory committees (SACs), 
the corporation has created the conditions for an iterative dialogue to evolve with 
local communities. This marked a shift from the lacklustre consultation conducted 
under the Task Force and a return to the more inclusive approach adopted by the 
Royal Commission in the early 1990s. 
 
For certain groups and community interests, the corporation’s participation process 
has generated a ‘sense of ownership’ over the waterfront redevelopment programme. 
However, it is not without its flaws. Earlier research has pointed to the corporation’s 
failure to engage a true cross-section of people and, in particular, those residents 
who live in underprivileged neighbourhoods close to the waterfront (Lehrer and 
Laidley 2008), as well as those who are new to the waterfront. A further concern, 
discussed in Section 9, pertains to the structure of the SACs, which, undertaken in 
private session to not offer the same level of openness and dialogue. 
 
Figure 34: Community collaboration and visioning 
 
1. Providing the conditions for all members of the community to be involved in the process 
of developing and committing to a coordinated vision of environmental beauty and design 
(revised from Brennan’s Law). 
 
Achievements: 
• Corporate commitment to public 
consultation and participation through a 
rigorous public consultation strategy. 
• Implementation of innovative public 
participation process on all plan-making 
and construction projects. 
• Accessible and well-attended public 
meetings. 
Future Challenges: 
 
• Delivery of design vision agreed between 
public and corporation. 
• Encouraging a wider cross section of 
people to take part in public participation 
process, especially new waterfront 
residents. 
• Recognising that priorities of new 
waterfront residents might shift and 
change. 
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2. Developing and monitoring urban design plans (at the citywide and site level) that are 
supported by the community. 
 
Achievements: 
• Local communities have assumed 
ownership of precinct plans and wider  
vision for the waterfront. 
 
Future Challenges: 
 
• Maintain trust achieved between local 
communities and corporation. 
 
3. Employing innovative participation tools that encourage the broadest cross-section of 
local people to participate in the design process. 
 
Achievements: 
• Iterative public meetings and SACs 
have created a strong feedback loop 
between communities and the 
corporation. 
• Report back meetings and on-going 
SACs meetings allow the general 
public to be engaged throughout all 
phases of planning and 
implementation. 
 
Future Challenges: 
• Lack of clarity in the SAC process needs 
to be addressed. 
• Maintaining ‘high bar’ set on initial plans 
and projects. 
 
With respect to the integration of planning and zoning and other instruments, the 
most important design-led planning documents on the waterfront are the precinct 
plans and the supporting zoning by-laws. In addition to establishing the core planning 
and design principles for the various sectors of the waterfront, the zoning by-laws 
also detail the specific contributions required from developers for housing and public 
realm costs in exchange for particular residential density and height allowances. 
These costs are typically subject to negotiation. Therefore, the legal agreements 
between the waterfront corporation and their development partners, discussed in 
Section 7, are therefore crucial. These reaffirm the targets that have been set in the 
precinct plans and the zoning by-law amendments and require developers to 
respond in kind. However, they are still to be fully tested and pertain only to the land 
controlled by the corporation (albeit the vast majority of land on the waterfront). The 
design excellence agenda on the waterfront is also underpinned by the appropriation 
of public money to the redevelopment programme and, in particular, the investment 
in ‘leading with landscape’, which support the early construction of public parks and 
open spaces. 
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Figure 35: Integration of planning and zoning and other instruments 
 
4. Harnessing the broadest range of actors and instruments (tax, subsidy, land acquisition, 
etc.) to promote better design and encourage the development of ecologically sensitive 
infrastructure. 
 
Achievements: 
• Channelling tri-government financial 
contributions towards public realm 
improvements. 
• Employing design competitions to 
encourage high design standard and 
committing to the renaturalisation of the 
Don River. 
 
Future Challenges: 
• Ensuring that tri-government 
commitment ($1.5bn), and future 
monies, to the corporation. 
• Achieving the long-term ambition of 
renaturalising the Don River. 
5. Mitigating the exclusionary effects of control strategies and urban design regulation. 
 
Achievements: 
• Investment in parks and open space. 
• Commitments to affordable/social 
housing. 
• Mandated contributions towards 
waterfront infrastructure, affordable 
housing in zoning by-law amendments 
and reaffirmed in developer agreements. 
 
Future Challenges: 
• Ensuring that private developers meet 
affordable and social housing targets for 
the waterfront. 
 
6. Integrating zoning into planning and addressing the limitations of zoning. 
 
Achievements: 
• Precinct plans translated into zoning by-
law amendments. 
• Zoning by-law amendments supported 
by urban design guidelines. 
 
Future Challenges: 
 
• Ensuring that the various mechanisms 
employed to protect spirit of precinct 
plans. 
 
As regards broad and substantive ecological urban design principles, the vision for 
the waterfront district, contained in the waterfront secondary plan (City of Toronto 
2002), provides a thorough, but not overly prescriptive, design-led framework which 
promotes normative urban design principles that focus on the creation of an 
accessible, human-scaled waterfront as well as supporting context-specific principles 
to guide development initiatives, such of the division of the waterfront into 
neighbourhood-scale precincts. The precinct plans and supplementary urban design 
guidelines offer further site-specific principles and objectives, which emphasise the 
relationships between built form and do not unduly focus on building aesthetics. 
 
There is considerable scope for design innovation and spontaneity to occur during 
the planning and design process and for individual building architects and landscape 
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architects to make their mark and, despite the early teething problems described in 
Section 8, the waterfront design review panel exists to ensure that a balance is 
sought between architectural creativity and the design principles contained in the 
precinct plans. Design creativity is further encouraged through the design 
competition process. 
 
Figure 36: Broad and substantive ecological design principles 
 
7. Basing urban design guidelines on generic (ecological) urban design principles that are 
developed in conjunction with the community and supported by contextual analysis. 
 
Achievements: 
• Corporate commitment to ‘design 
excellence’. 
• Established urban design principles 
underpin programme. 
• Local communities have played a role in 
production of plans and policies for the 
waterfront since 2003. 
 
Future Challenges: 
• Scope for ecology to be more fully 
integrated into waterfront programme. 
 
8. Using a collaborative process to explore how ecological urban design principles, such as 
amenity, accessibility, community, vitality, energy efficiency and resilient form, might be 
mutually beneficial to all local stakeholders. 
 
Achievements 
 
• Sustainable revitalisation program 
defined during the precinct planning 
processes. 
 
Future Challenges: 
• Engagement with local communities 
about ecological urban design. 
• Realising long-standing transformative 
ecological commitment (the Don River). 
9. Articulating desired and mandatory urban design outcomes in the design process, while 
allowing spontaneity, vitality, innovation and pluralism to flourish. 
 
Achievements: 
• Emphasis on controlling baseline urban 
design outcomes rather than mandating 
particular architectural treatments. 
• Design excellence and innovation 
undergirded by design competitions.  
 
Future Challenges: 
 
• Ensure design review feedback is clear 
and constructive. 
 
Urban design theory has tended to focus on the qualities and aesthetics of urban 
space for human usage and, broadly speaking, this approach has guided the ‘design 
excellence’ agenda on Toronto’s waterfront since 1999. Recent urban design theory, 
however, increasingly conceptualises urban design through an ecological lens (e.g. 
Hester 2008) and it is important to recount that sustainability was identified as a core 
concern on the waterfront in the 1992 report by the Royal Commission, which 
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characterised the waterfront revitalisation in ecological terms. While this approach 
did not necessarily come to dominate subsequent planning and design efforts, the 
legacy of the Royal Commission’s work is clearly evident in the precinct planning 
work for the Port Lands, where the vision to improve the ecological condition of the 
Don River through the renaturalisation of the river estuary remains a key principle. 
 
Figure 37: Winning Submission for the Port Lands Estuary 
(Waterfront Toronto 2007e, 3) 
 
A visualisation showing how the re-naturalised Don River might appear in the future following 
a 2007 design competition for the Lower Don Lands precinct in the Port Lands that was won 
by a team led by landscape architect Michael Van Valkenberg.  
 
Looking finally at due process and skills, the link that has been forged between the 
secondary plan, the waterfront precinct plans and specific open space and building 
projects is critical. The measures that have been taken, such as the use of urban 
design guidelines and the deployment of a peer review design panel, heighten the role 
that urban design plays in the planning decision-making process but, at the same 
time, serves to circumvent the regulatory failings of the extant planning system. As a 
result, design control on the waterfront rests on the relationship that exists between 
the City of Toronto, as the planning approval authority, and the waterfront 
corporation as master planner. At present, the two organisations work well together 
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and the planning and design vision for the waterfront is a shared one. All of the 
waterfront precinct plans have also been fully endorsed by the City of Toronto 
Council and all applications for site plan approval receive an enormous amount of 
scrutiny through the design review process and the corporation’s SACs before they 
are finally assessed by the City of Toronto. Nevertheless, this collaboration is only 
good as long as it lasts. The personalities of key decision-makers, a problematic 
development project or the impact of a new political agenda could all weaken the 
fragile relationships that have been used to work around the corporation’s 
governance model – as Section 8 vividly demonstrated through the example of the 
Corus Building.  
 
Lastly, the integration of urban design skills and real estate expertise into the 
planning and design process on Toronto’s waterfront is both impressive and far-
reaching. This achievement can be traced to the years of the Task Force, when 
Robert Fung, a successful businessman but design novice, sought the skills of 
private sector design experts to produce his vision and management plan in 2000. 
Fung selected a team of urban designers with a combination of local and 
international master planning experience. Yet, this group was also chosen because 
they understood large-scale redevelopment and the role that urban design plays in 
the wider planning and real estate process. They were not just planners and 
designers, but ‘market actors’. It was during this period that the concept of precinct 
planning emerged, as well as the emphasis on ‘design excellence’ that eventually 
became a core policy objective that is now directly supported, in practice, by the 
waterfront design review panel. 
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Figure 38: Due process and skills 
 
10. Identify clear a priori rules and guidelines for urban design intervention to avoid arbitrary 
discretionary decision-making. 
 
Achievements: 
• Level of urban design control exceeds 
that traditionally found in Toronto. 
• Proceedings of the review panel are 
underpinned by the urban design 
objectives contained in the hierarchy of 
waterfront plans and guidance. 
 
Future Challenges: 
• Ensuring review panel conducts 
discussions within the bounds of the 
waterfront planning and urban design 
policy framework. 
11. Establishing proper administrative procedures with written opinions to manage discretion 
and implementing an efficient, constructive and effective permitting process that is 
supported by an appropriate appeal mechanism. 
 
Achievements: 
• The review panel must assess all 
waterfront development applications 
before planning approvals can be 
sought. 
• Success of waterfront review panel has 
led to a (non mandatory) review panel 
being formed by the City of Toronto. 
 
Future Challenges: 
• Mitigating political intervention in the 
planning and design process.  
 
12. Providing appropriate design skills and expertise to support the urban design 
policymaking and review process. 
 
Achievements: 
• Dedicated urban design staff at the 
corporation. 
• Review panel established to evaluate all 
design and planning proposals on the 
waterfront. 
 
Future Challenges: 
• Ensuring that conflicts of interest do not 
emerge during the design review 
process. 
13. Equipping planning and urban design staff with knowledge of the local property market 
and advancing their skills in collaborative negotiation to build capacity with public and 
private sector actors. 
 
Achievements: 
Stakeholder forums allow private and 
public actors to discuss planning, design 
and development in a collaborative 
forum, reducing the conditions for 
conflict. 
Future Challenges: 
• Ensuring that a positive dialogue 
between public and private sector actors 
continues throughout all the various 
phases of implementation and 
construction. 
 
 
 
10.4 A positive public private partnership? 
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In spite of the glossy focus on global competition espoused by the Task Force in the 
early 2000s, the design language of Toronto’s waterfront and the urban design goals 
and objectives of the corporation have aired on the side of pragmatism. The current 
chapter of the waterfront redevelopment story was initiated by a bid for the Olympic 
Games and began like many other large-scale waterfront projects with a focus on a 
‘spectacle’ events to draw capital to the city. However, the failure of the bid changed 
this narrative and, ever since, the aim has not been to furnish the waterfront with 
arts, cultural or sports projects, but instead to create a series of mixed-use 
neighbourhoods linked together by high quality public accessible space. 
 
This long-term vision remains the goal of the waterfront corporation and marks it out 
from other waterfront cities that have undertaken much more aggressive processes 
led by short-term capital investment and flagship development or architectural set 
pieces (e.g. Harvey 1991; Dovey 2005; Punter 2007a). In reflecting on the use of 
urban design on Toronto’s waterfront, it is therefore pertinent to remember Biddulph’s 
assessment of Liverpool (2011) and to note that, while urban design can easily get 
caught up in an agenda of global competition, it can still be governed in the public 
interest and used to create accessible public spaces and sustainable urban design 
qualities. This is undoubtedly the case in Toronto where the early planning and 
design documents used the language of global competition and the New Economy to 
shape the waterfront vision, but the reality of the subsequent implementation appears 
to be more nuanced combining economic goals with a clear desire to reconnect the 
city with the waterfront and create new public space to encourage its repopulation. 
 
Research in the field of planning and urban design, which has long shown that short-
term political agendas, financial instability and weak institutions impact the pursuit of 
a long-term design vision (Sandercock and Dovey 2002; Dovey 2005; Punter 2007; 
Bezmez 2008). These themes are germane to the case of Toronto’s waterfront, 
especially in the early years of the new waterfront corporation, when its efforts to 
foster a design-led planning process were marred by periods of institutional 
uncertainty and a general unwillingness to radically transform the regulatory planning 
framework for the waterfront. The impediments of the waterfront corporation’s 
governance model loom large over its ambitious redevelopment programme and, as 
a result, the case of the Toronto waterfront cannot be cast as an exemplar of urban 
design governance in the way cities like Vancouver (Punter 2003) or Barcelona 
(Marshall 2004) might. The achievement of a truly integrated commitment to design-
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led planning in Toronto remains a goal yet reached and the story of urban design 
governance on the city’s waterfront is one characterised by fighting against the odds 
and working around regulatory impediments and financial roadblocks to deliver a 
quality built environment. At the very least, then, the story of the Toronto’s waterfront 
corporation stands as an example of resourcefulness when the powers to act 
effectively are limited. More than that, however, the corporation has successfully 
trodden a fine line between being the public steward of the waterfront on the one 
hand and a real estate developer on the other and the case demonstrates how urban 
design can emerge as a central part of a more sophisticated conversation about the 
future of space and place.  
 
The design story on Toronto’s waterfront has been characterised by moments of 
political courage and leadership, far reaching aspirations and policies and a sense of 
shared commitment between the producers, uses and regulators of the built 
environment. When taken at face value, the corporation has the appearance of a 
‘corporate’ organisation. Its founding chair was a billionaire businessman and its 
current CEO a real estate developer. Yet, the corporation has not lost sight of its 
public mission. It has broken down some of the barriers that typically exist between 
the public and private sectors and has allowed urban design to be driven as much by 
policy imperatives as by market conditions. This outcome has been determined by 
the iterative relationships that have been built with local people and other waterfront 
stakeholders through the corporation’s approach to public consultation and 
engagement. Together, the corporation’s thorough and methodological engagement 
processes have generated a ‘sense of ownership’ by the local community over the 
waterfront precinct plans and, indeed, the corporation’s broader urban design vision 
for the waterfront. The mutual trust that has emerged between institutional actors and 
the general public mirrors theoretical aspirations for a ‘soft infrastructure’ of 
relationship-building in planning practice, that allows diverse participants to discuss 
planning concerns at a level beyond the elementary (Healey 2006) and to share in 
the decision-making process with dominant agents (Bond and Thompson-Fawcett 
2007), in this case urban design and real estate development experts. Toronto’s 
waterfront, this author would argue, represents a positive public-private partnership. 
 
 
 
 
10.5 What does the future hold? 
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The story of Toronto’s waterfront redevelopment is far from over and, while this 
paper might have paused to reflect on the progress so far, the waterfront corporation 
continues its work. Despite continuing to face funding delays and political setbacks, 
the corporation has won numerous awards for its planning and design efforts 
(Waterfront Toronto 2013) and is now fully engaged in the job of implementation. 
 
The closest the corporation has come to crisis in the current decade occurred – 
perhaps inevitability – during the second year of the tumultuous mayoralty of Rob 
Ford, who assumed office in 2010 when he replaced David Miller on a no-nonsense 
budget-cutting agenda. Not long after his election, Mayor Ford focused his attention 
on the waterfront corporation, describing it as a perfect example of government 
waste and excess in Toronto and “the biggest boondoggle the feds, the province and 
the city has ever done.” (quoted in Doolittle, 2011, 1). In the summer of 2011 the 
Mayor’s brother, Doug Ford, himself a member of the City of Toronto council and a 
champion of the mayor’s agenda, announced a proposal to take control of 
redevelopment in the Port Lands away from the waterfront corporation and work with 
a local developer to built a shopping mall, Ferris wheel and monorail (Doolittle 2011; 
James 2011). Doug Ford’s vision for the waterfront was no joke and the mayor’s 
powerful executive committee unanimously approved the proposal in early 
September 2011 (James 2011). However, in a high profile meeting of the City of 
Toronto Council a few weeks later, his plan was ultimately dismissed by a full vote of 
council. Such an outcome was by no means guaranteed and one of the key reasons 
that Council voted to dismiss Ford’s plan rested on the unprecedented support for 
the corporation and its waterfront vision from local people, community groups and the 
Toronto planning and design community. Council also recognised the many years of 
consultation and community participation that had been conducted by the corporation. 
Cindy Wilkey, chair of the West Don Lands Committee, and one of the community 
architects of the corporation’s public participation strategy, called the council vote a 
“stunning reversal” and admitted that she did not realise that Torontonians were “so 
passionate about the waterfront” (quoted in James 2011, 1). 
 
In 2013 the waterfront corporation passed the half way mark of its 20-year mandate 
and, in 2017, it is expected to reach the limit of its $1.5 billion tri-government funding. 
The corporation has so far invested $1.3 billion of public money in the waterfront 
redevelopment programme and, in its 2013-2014 strategic business plan, states that 
this has resulted in “revenues of $348 million to the federal government, $237 million 
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to the provincial government and $36 million to the City of Toronto” (Waterfront 
Toronto, 2013, 6). The report further states that the corporation’s waterfront 
redevelopment programme has generated $3.2 billion of economic output for the 
Canadian economy. The corporation anticipates that a further $1.65 billion will be 
required for it to fulfil its 20-year mandate (Church 2014) and, in its 2013-14 business 
plan, states that a short term line of credit and longer term loans are critical for its 
future financial planning. However, the business plan also reiterates what the 
corporation has long stated, that in order to realise its vision for the waterfront it 
requires “the power to borrow and encumber assets” (Waterfront Toronto 2013, 19) 
rather than rely on short-term contribution agreements from the three levels of 
government. Most recently, in June 2015, the issue of the Gardiner Expressway 
returned to the political agenda after a long hiatus when plans to demolish the 
elevated road were voted down by a small margin by Toronto City Council. The 
Council instead voted in favour of reducing the impact of the expressway on the 
eastern edge of the waterfront through a series of changes to the existing road 
network. Notably, councillors representing downtown residents voted in favour of 
removing the elevated highway, whereas those from suburban wards voted to retain 
it and undertake the much less dramatic improvement works (Rider 2015). 
 
It is here that this particular account of Toronto’s waterfront redevelopment 
programme concludes. The avenues for further research on Toronto’s waterfront are 
multiple and wide-ranging, and will undoubtedly evolve as the next phase of the 
redevelopment programme takes shape. Looking through the lens of design 
governance and, based upon the evidence, this author’s own prediction for the future 
of Toronto’s waterfront is broadly positive. Undoubtedly many more challenges will 
arise, but the drive and ambition of the waterfront corporation is palpable and the true 
renaissance of Toronto’s lost edge appears to finally be within grasp. Nevertheless, 
many questions remain: Will the Gardiner Expressway ever be torn down and the 
connection between downtown Toronto and the waterfront restored? Will the 
ambitious master plan for the Port Lands and the re-naturalisation of the Don River 
ever be achieved? Will Toronto’s waterfront become a public room for all 
Torontonians? How will the downtown ‘condo boom’ impact the waterfront 
redevelopment vision? And, will future mayors of Toronto champion or challenge the 
corporation’s vision for the waterfront? Researchers must continue to ask questions 
such as these and seek to understand whether the urban design processes 
established by the corporation in the first decade of the 2000s have resulted in a 
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sustainable, open and accessible public realm that new residents are proud to call 
home. 
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Appendix: Description of codes 
 
The numbers assigned to the participants below donates their categorisation in the 
full list of research participants for the wider project that led to this paper. 
 
TORONTO 8 
Former planning director at City of Toronto 
 
TWRC 3  
Senior executive and urban designer 
 
TWRC 5 
Former senior executive and urban designer 
 
TWRC 7  
Senior executive with managerial responsibilities 
 
TWRC 8 
Former senior executive with managerial responsibilities  
 
DESIGN 1 
Toronto-based urban designer and former urban designer at the City of Toronto 
 
DESIGN 10  
Partner at a Toronto-based urban design and planning firm 
 
POLITICAL 2  
Former City of Toronto senior political advisor with waterfront responsibilities 
 
CIVIL 2:  
Leader in neighbourhood association adjacent to Toronto’s waterfront 
 
CIVIL 5 
Leader in neighbourhood association adjacent to Toronto’s waterfront 
 
